X. TERRAIN

X. TERRAIN

[Only about a third of the chapter, comprising ss. ss. 1-13,

deals with "terrain," the subject being more fully treated in ch.

XI. The "six calamities" are discussed in SS. 14-20, and the

rest of the chapter is again a mere string of desultory remarks,

though not less interesting, perhaps, on that account.]

1. Sun Tzu said: We may distinguish six kinds of terrain,

to wit: (1) Accessible ground;

[Mei Yao-ch`en says: "plentifully provided with roads and

means of communications."]

(2) entangling ground;

[The same commentator says: "Net-like country, venturing

into which you become entangled."]

(3) temporizing ground;

[Ground which allows you to "stave off" or "delay."]

(4) narrow passes;

(5) precipitous heights;

(6) positions at a great distance from the enemy.

[It is hardly necessary to point out the faultiness of this

classification. A strange lack of logical perception is shown in

the Chinaman's unquestioning acceptance of glaring cross-

divisions such as the above.]

2. Ground which can be freely traversed by both sides is

called ACCESSIBLE.

3. With regard to ground of this nature, be before the

enemy in occupying the raised and sunny spots, and carefully

guard your line of supplies.

[The general meaning of the last phrase is doubtlessly, as

Tu Yu says, "not to allow the enemy to cut your communications."

In view of Napoleon's dictum, "the secret of war lies in the

communications," [1] we could wish that Sun Tzu had done more

than skirt the edge of this important subject here and in I. ss.

10, VII. ss. 11. Col. Henderson says: "The line of supply may

be said to be as vital to the existence of an army as the heart

to the life of a human being. Just as the duelist who finds his

adversary's point menacing him with certain death, and his own

guard astray, is compelled to conform to his adversary's

movements, and to content himself with warding off his thrusts,

so the commander whose communications are suddenly threatened

finds himself in a false position, and he will be fortunate if he

has not to change all his plans, to split up his force into more

or less isolated detachments, and to fight with inferior numbers

on ground which he has not had time to prepare, and where defeat

will not be an ordinary failure, but will entail the ruin or

surrender of his whole army." [2]

Then you will be able to fight with advantage.

4. Ground which can be abandoned but is hard to re-occupy

is called ENTANGLING.

5. From a position of this sort, if the enemy is

unprepared, you may sally forth and defeat him. But if the enemy

is prepared for your coming, and you fail to defeat him, then,

return being impossible, disaster will ensue.

6. When the position is such that neither side will gain by

making the first move, it is called TEMPORIZING ground.

[Tu Mu says: "Each side finds it inconvenient to move, and

the situation remains at a deadlock."]

7. In a position of this sort, even though the enemy should

offer us an attractive bait,

[Tu Yu says, "turning their backs on us and pretending to

flee." But this is only one of the lures which might induce us

to quit our position.]

it will be advisable not to stir forth, but rather to retreat,

thus enticing the enemy in his turn; then, when part of his army

has come out, we may deliver our attack with advantage.

8. With regard to NARROW PASSES, if you can occupy them

first, let them be strongly garrisoned and await the advent of

the enemy.

[Because then, as Tu Yu observes, "the initiative will lie

with us, and by making sudden and unexpected attacks we shall

have the enemy at our mercy."]

9. Should the army forestall you in occupying a pass, do

not go after him if the pass is fully garrisoned, but only if it

is weakly garrisoned.

10. With regard to PRECIPITOUS HEIGHTS, if you are

beforehand with your adversary, you should occupy the raised and

sunny spots, and there wait for him to come up.

[Ts`ao Kung says: "The particular advantage of securing

heights and defiles is that your actions cannot then be dictated

by the enemy." [For the enunciation of the grand principle

alluded to, see VI. ss. 2]. Chang Yu tells the following

anecdote of P`ei Hsing-chien (A.D. 619-682), who was sent on a

punitive expedition against the Turkic tribes. "At night he

pitched his camp as usual, and it had already been completely

fortified by wall and ditch, when suddenly he gave orders that

the army should shift its quarters to a hill near by. This was

highly displeasing to his officers, who protested loudly against

the extra fatigue which it would entail on the men. P`ei Hsing-

chien, however, paid no heed to their remonstrances and had the

camp moved as quickly as possible. The same night, a terrific

storm came on, which flooded their former place of encampment to

the depth of over twelve feet. The recalcitrant officers were

amazed at the sight, and owned that they had been in the wrong.

'How did you know what was going to happen?' they asked. P`ei

Hsing-chien replied: 'From this time forward be content to obey

orders without asking unnecessary questions.' From this it may

be seen," Chang Yu continues, "that high and sunny places are

advantageous not only for fighting, but also because they are

immune from disastrous floods."]

11. If the enemy has occupied them before you, do not

follow him, but retreat and try to entice him away.

[The turning point of Li Shih-min's campaign in 621 A.D.

against the two rebels, Tou Chien-te, King of Hsia, and Wang

Shih-ch`ung, Prince of Cheng, was his seizure of the heights of

Wu-lao, in spike of which Tou Chien-te persisted in his attempt

to relieve his ally in Lo-yang, was defeated and taken prisoner.

See CHIU T`ANG, ch. 2, fol. 5 verso, and also ch. 54.]

12. If you are situated at a great distance from the enemy,

and the strength of the two armies is equal, it is not easy to

provoke a battle,

[The point is that we must not think of undertaking a long

and wearisome march, at the end of which, as Tu Yu says, "we

should be exhausted and our adversary fresh and keen."]

and fighting will be to your disadvantage.

13. These six are the principles connected with Earth.

[Or perhaps, "the principles relating to ground." See,

however, I. ss. 8.]

The general who has attained a responsible post must be careful

to study them.

14. Now an army is exposed to six several calamities, not

arising from natural causes, but from faults for which the

general is responsible. These are: (1) Flight; (2)

insubordination; (3) collapse; (4) ruin; (5) disorganization; (6)

rout.

15. Other conditions being equal, if one force is hurled

against another ten times its size, the result will be the FLIGHT

of the former.

16. When the common soldiers are too strong and their

officers too weak, the result is INSUBORDINATION.

[Tu Mu cites the unhappy case of T`ien Pu [HSIN T`ANG SHU,

ch. 148], who was sent to Wei in 821 A.D. with orders to lead an

army against Wang T`ing-ts`ou. But the whole time he was in

command, his soldiers treated him with the utmost contempt, and

openly flouted his authority by riding about the camp on donkeys,

several thousands at a time. T`ien Pu was powerless to put a

stop to this conduct, and when, after some months had passed, he

made an attempt to engage the enemy, his troops turned tail and

dispersed in every direction. After that, the unfortunate man

committed suicide by cutting his throat.]

When the officers are too strong and the common soldiers too

weak, the result is COLLAPSE.

[Ts`ao Kung says: "The officers are energetic and want to

press on, the common soldiers are feeble and suddenly collapse."]

17. When the higher officers are angry and insubordinate,

and on meeting the enemy give battle on their own account from a

feeling of resentment, before the commander-in-chief can tell

whether or no he is in a position to fight, the result is RUIN.

[Wang Hsi`s note is: "This means, the general is angry

without cause, and at the same time does not appreciate the

ability of his subordinate officers; thus he arouses fierce

resentment and brings an avalanche of ruin upon his head."]

18. When the general is weak and without authority; when

his orders are not clear and distinct;

[Wei Liao Tzu (ch. 4) says: "If the commander gives his

orders with decision, the soldiers will not wait to hear them

twice; if his moves are made without vacillation, the soldiers

will not be in two minds about doing their duty." General Baden-

Powell says, italicizing the words: "The secret of getting

successful work out of your trained men lies in one nutshell--in

the clearness of the instructions they receive." [3] Cf. also

Wu Tzu ch. 3: "the most fatal defect in a military leader is

difference; the worst calamities that befall an army arise from

hesitation."]

when there are no fixes duties assigned to officers and men,

[Tu Mu says: "Neither officers nor men have any regular

routine."]

and the ranks are formed in a slovenly haphazard manner, the

result is utter DISORGANIZATION.

19. When a general, unable to estimate the enemy's

strength, allows an inferior force to engage a larger one, or

hurls a weak detachment against a powerful one, and neglects to

place picked soldiers in the front rank, the result must be ROUT.

[Chang Yu paraphrases the latter part of the sentence and

continues: "Whenever there is fighting to be done, the keenest

spirits should be appointed to serve in the front ranks, both in

order to strengthen the resolution of our own men and to

demoralize the enemy." Cf. the primi ordines of Caesar ("De

Bello Gallico," V. 28, 44, et al.).]

20. These are six ways of courting defeat, which must be

carefully noted by the general who has attained a responsible

post.

[See supra, ss. 13.]

21. The natural formation of the country is the soldier's

best ally;

[Ch`en Hao says: "The advantages of weather and season are

not equal to those connected with ground."]

but a power of estimating the adversary, of controlling the

forces of victory, and of shrewdly calculating difficulties,

dangers and distances, constitutes the test of a great general.

22. He who knows these things, and in fighting puts his

knowledge into practice, will win his battles. He who knows them

not, nor practices them, will surely be defeated.

23. If fighting is sure to result in victory, then you must

fight, even though the ruler forbid it; if fighting will not

result in victory, then you must not fight even at the ruler's

bidding.

[Cf. VIII. ss. 3 fin. Huang Shih-kung of the Ch`in dynasty,

who is said to have been the patron of Chang Liang and to have

written the SAN LUEH, has these words attributed to him: "The

responsibility of setting an army in motion must devolve on the

general alone; if advance and retreat are controlled from the

Palace, brilliant results will hardly be achieved. Hence the

god-like ruler and the enlightened monarch are content to play a

humble part in furthering their country's cause [lit., kneel down

to push the chariot wheel]." This means that "in matters lying

outside the zenana, the decision of the military commander must

be absolute." Chang Yu also quote the saying: "Decrees from the

Son of Heaven do not penetrate the walls of a camp."]

24. The general who advances without coveting fame and

retreats without fearing disgrace,

[It was Wellington, I think, who said that the hardest thing

of all for a soldier is to retreat.]

whose only thought is to protect his country and do good service

for his sovereign, is the jewel of the kingdom.

[A noble presentiment, in few words, of the Chinese "happy

warrior." Such a man, says Ho Shih, "even if he had to suffer

punishment, would not regret his conduct."]

25. Regard your soldiers as your children, and they will

follow you into the deepest valleys; look upon them as your own

beloved sons, and they will stand by you even unto death.

[Cf. I. ss. 6. In this connection, Tu Mu draws for us an

engaging picture of the famous general Wu Ch`i, from whose

treatise on war I have frequently had occasion to quote: "He

wore the same clothes and ate the same food as the meanest of his

soldiers, refused to have either a horse to ride or a mat to

sleep on, carried his own surplus rations wrapped in a parcel,

and shared every hardship with his men. One of his soldiers was

suffering from an abscess, and Wu Ch`i himself sucked out the

virus. The soldier's mother, hearing this, began wailing and

lamenting. Somebody asked her, saying: 'Why do you cry? Your

son is only a common soldier, and yet the commander-in-chief

himself has sucked the poison from his sore.' The woman replied,

'Many years ago, Lord Wu performed a similar service for my

husband, who never left him afterwards, and finally met his death

at the hands of the enemy. And now that he has done the same for

my son, he too will fall fighting I know not where.'" Li Ch`uan

mentions the Viscount of Ch`u, who invaded the small state of

Hsiao during the winter. The Duke of Shen said to him: "Many of

the soldiers are suffering severely from the cold." So he made a

round of the whole army, comforting and encouraging the men; and

straightway they felt as if they were clothed in garments lined

with floss silk.]

26. If, however, you are indulgent, but unable to make your

authority felt; kind-hearted, but unable to enforce your

commands; and incapable, moreover, of quelling disorder: then

your soldiers must be likened to spoilt children; they are

useless for any practical purpose.

[Li Ching once said that if you could make your soldiers

afraid of you, they would not be afraid of the enemy. Tu Mu

recalls an instance of stern military discipline which occurred

in 219 A.D., when Lu Meng was occupying the town of Chiang-ling.

He had given stringent orders to his army not to molest the

inhabitants nor take anything from them by force. Nevertheless,

a certain officer serving under his banner, who happened to be a

fellow-townsman, ventured to appropriate a bamboo hat belonging

to one of the people, in order to wear it over his regulation

helmet as a protection against the rain. Lu Meng considered that

the fact of his being also a native of Ju-nan should not be

allowed to palliate a clear breach of discipline, and accordingly

he ordered his summary execution, the tears rolling down his

face, however, as he did so. This act of severity filled the

army with wholesome awe, and from that time forth even articles

dropped in the highway were not picked up.]

27. If we know that our own men are in a condition to

attack, but are unaware that the enemy is not open to attack, we

have gone only halfway towards victory.

[That is, Ts`ao Kung says, "the issue in this case is

uncertain."]

28. If we know that the enemy is open to attack, but are

unaware that our own men are not in a condition to attack, we

have gone only halfway towards victory.

[Cf. III. ss. 13 (1).]

29. If we know that the enemy is open to attack, and also

know that our men are in a condition to attack, but are unaware

that the nature of the ground makes fighting impracticable, we

have still gone only halfway towards victory.

30. Hence the experienced soldier, once in motion, is never

bewildered; once he has broken camp, he is never at a loss.

[The reason being, according to Tu Mu, that he has taken his

measures so thoroughly as to ensure victory beforehand. "He does

not move recklessly," says Chang Yu, "so that when he does move,

he makes no mistakes."]

31. Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know

yourself, your victory will not stand in doubt; if you know

Heaven and know Earth, you may make your victory complete.

[Li Ch`uan sums up as follows: "Given a knowledge of three

things--the affairs of men, the seasons of heaven and the natural

advantages of earth--, victory will invariably crown your

battles."]

[1] See "Pensees de Napoleon 1er," no. 47.

[2] "The Science of War," chap. 2.

[3] "Aids to Scouting," p. xii.