II. WAGING WAR

II. WAGING WAR

[Ts`ao Kung has the note: "He who wishes to fight must

first count the cost," which prepares us for the discovery that

the subject of the chapter is not what we might expect from the

title, but is primarily a consideration of ways and means.]

1. Sun Tzu said: In the operations of war, where there are

in the field a thousand swift chariots, as many heavy chariots,

and a hundred thousand mail-clad soldiers,

[The "swift chariots" were lightly built and, according to

Chang Yu, used for the attack; the "heavy chariots" were heavier,

and designed for purposes of defense. Li Ch`uan, it is true,

says that the latter were light, but this seems hardly probable.

It is interesting to note the analogies between early Chinese

warfare and that of the Homeric Greeks. In each case, the war-

chariot was the important factor, forming as it did the nucleus

round which was grouped a certain number of foot-soldiers. With

regard to the numbers given here, we are informed that each swift

chariot was accompanied by 75 footmen, and each heavy chariot by

25 footmen, so that the whole army would be divided up into a

thousand battalions, each consisting of two chariots and a

hundred men.]

with provisions enough to carry them a thousand LI,

[2.78 modern LI go to a mile. The length may have varied

slightly since Sun Tzu's time.]

the expenditure at home and at the front, including entertainment

of guests, small items such as glue and paint, and sums spent on

chariots and armor, will reach the total of a thousand ounces of

silver per day. Such is the cost of raising an army of 100,000

men.

2. When you engage in actual fighting, if victory is long

in coming, then men's weapons will grow dull and their ardor will

be damped. If you lay siege to a town, you will exhaust your

strength.

3. Again, if the campaign is protracted, the resources of

the State will not be equal to the strain.

4. Now, when your weapons are dulled, your ardor damped,

your strength exhausted and your treasure spent, other chieftains

will spring up to take advantage of your extremity. Then no man,

however wise, will be able to avert the consequences that must

ensue.

5. Thus, though we have heard of stupid haste in war,

cleverness has never been seen associated with long delays.

[This concise and difficult sentence is not well explained

by any of the commentators. Ts`ao Kung, Li Ch`uan, Meng Shih, Tu

Yu, Tu Mu and Mei Yao-ch`en have notes to the effect that a

general, though naturally stupid, may nevertheless conquer

through sheer force of rapidity. Ho Shih says: "Haste may be

stupid, but at any rate it saves expenditure of energy and

treasure; protracted operations may be very clever, but they

bring calamity in their train." Wang Hsi evades the difficulty

by remarking: "Lengthy operations mean an army growing old,

wealth being expended, an empty exchequer and distress among the

people; true cleverness insures against the occurrence of such

calamities." Chang Yu says: "So long as victory can be

attained, stupid haste is preferable to clever dilatoriness."

Now Sun Tzu says nothing whatever, except possibly by

implication, about ill-considered haste being better than

ingenious but lengthy operations. What he does say is something

much more guarded, namely that, while speed may sometimes be

injudicious, tardiness can never be anything but foolish -- if

only because it means impoverishment to the nation. In

considering the point raised here by Sun Tzu, the classic example

of Fabius Cunctator will inevitably occur to the mind. That

general deliberately measured the endurance of Rome against that

of Hannibals's isolated army, because it seemed to him that the

latter was more likely to suffer from a long campaign in a

strange country. But it is quite a moot question whether his

tactics would have proved successful in the long run. Their

reversal it is true, led to Cannae; but this only establishes a

negative presumption in their favor.]

6. There is no instance of a country having benefited from

prolonged warfare.

7. It is only one who is thoroughly acquainted with the

evils of war that can thoroughly understand the profitable way of

carrying it on.

[That is, with rapidity. Only one who knows the disastrous

effects of a long war can realize the supreme importance of

rapidity in bringing it to a close. Only two commentators seem

to favor this interpretation, but it fits well into the logic of

the context, whereas the rendering, "He who does not know the

evils of war cannot appreciate its benefits," is distinctly

pointless.]

8. The skillful soldier does not raise a second levy,

neither are his supply-wagons loaded more than twice.

[Once war is declared, he will not waste precious time in

waiting for reinforcements, nor will he return his army back for

fresh supplies, but crosses the enemy's frontier without delay.

This may seem an audacious policy to recommend, but with all

great strategists, from Julius Caesar to Napoleon Bonaparte, the

value of time -- that is, being a little ahead of your opponent --

has counted for more than either numerical superiority or the

nicest calculations with regard to commissariat.]

9. Bring war material with you from home, but forage on the

enemy. Thus the army will have food enough for its needs.

[The Chinese word translated here as "war material"

literally means "things to be used", and is meant in the widest

sense. It includes all the impedimenta of an army, apart from

provisions.]

10. Poverty of the State exchequer causes an army to be

maintained by contributions from a distance. Contributing to

maintain an army at a distance causes the people to be

impoverished.

[The beginning of this sentence does not balance properly

with the next, though obviously intended to do so. The

arrangement, moreover, is so awkward that I cannot help

suspecting some corruption in the text. It never seems to occur

to Chinese commentators that an emendation may be necessary for

the sense, and we get no help from them there. The Chinese words

Sun Tzu used to indicate the cause of the people's impoverishment

clearly have reference to some system by which the husbandmen

sent their contributions of corn to the army direct. But why

should it fall on them to maintain an army in this way, except

because the State or Government is too poor to do so?]

11. On the other hand, the proximity of an army causes

prices to go up; and high prices cause the people's substance to

be drained away.

[Wang Hsi says high prices occur before the army has left

its own territory. Ts`ao Kung understands it of an army that has

already crossed the frontier.]

12. When their substance is drained away, the peasantry

will be afflicted by heavy exactions.

13, 14. With this loss of substance and exhaustion of

strength, the homes of the people will be stripped bare, and

three-tenths of their income will be dissipated;

[Tu Mu and Wang Hsi agree that the people are not mulcted

not of 3/10, but of 7/10, of their income. But this is hardly to

be extracted from our text. Ho Shih has a characteristic tag:

"The PEOPLE being regarded as the essential part of the State,

and FOOD as the people's heaven, is it not right that those in

authority should value and be careful of both?"]

while government expenses for broken chariots, worn-out horses,

breast-plates and helmets, bows and arrows, spears and shields,

protective mantles, draught-oxen and heavy wagons, will amount to

four-tenths of its total revenue.

15. Hence a wise general makes a point of foraging on the

enemy. One cartload of the enemy's provisions is equivalent to

twenty of one's own, and likewise a single PICUL of his provender

is equivalent to twenty from one's own store.

[Because twenty cartloads will be consumed in the process of

transporting one cartload to the front. A PICUL is a unit of

measure equal to 133.3 pounds (65.5 kilograms).]

16. Now in order to kill the enemy, our men must be roused

to anger; that there may be advantage from defeating the enemy,

they must have their rewards.

[Tu Mu says: "Rewards are necessary in order to make the

soldiers see the advantage of beating the enemy; thus, when you

capture spoils from the enemy, they must be used as rewards, so

that all your men may have a keen desire to fight, each on his

own account."]

17. Therefore in chariot fighting, when ten or more

chariots have been taken, those should be rewarded who took the

first. Our own flags should be substituted for those of the

enemy, and the chariots mingled and used in conjunction with

ours. The captured soldiers should be kindly treated and kept.

18. This is called, using the conquered foe to augment

one's own strength.

19. In war, then, let your great object be victory, not

lengthy campaigns.

[As Ho Shih remarks: "War is not a thing to be trifled

with." Sun Tzu here reiterates the main lesson which this

chapter is intended to enforce."]

20. Thus it may be known that the leader of armies is the

arbiter of the people's fate, the man on whom it depends whether

the nation shall be in peace or in peril.