X. THE ARMY ON THE MARCH

X. THE ARMY ON THE MARCH

[The contents of this interesting chapter are better

indicated in ss. 1 than by this heading.]

1. Sun Tzu said: We come now to the question of encamping

the army, and observing signs of the enemy. Pass quickly over

mountains, and keep in the neighborhood of valleys.

[The idea is, not to linger among barren uplands, but to

keep close to supplies of water and grass. Cf. Wu Tzu, ch. 3:

"Abide not in natural ovens," i.e. "the openings of valleys."

Chang Yu tells the following anecdote: Wu-tu Ch`iang was a

robber captain in the time of the Later Han, and Ma Yuan was sent

to exterminate his gang. Ch`iang having found a refuge in the

hills, Ma Yuan made no attempt to force a battle, but seized all

the favorable positions commanding supplies of water and forage.

Ch`iang was soon in such a desperate plight for want of

provisions that he was forced to make a total surrender. He did

not know the advantage of keeping in the neighborhood of

valleys."]

2. Camp in high places,

[Not on high hills, but on knolls or hillocks elevated above

the surrounding country.]

facing the sun.

[Tu Mu takes this to mean "facing south," and Ch`en Hao

"facing east." Cf. infra, SS. 11, 13.

Do not climb heights in order to fight. So much for mountain

warfare.

3. After crossing a river, you should get far away from it.

["In order to tempt the enemy to cross after you," according

to Ts`ao Kung, and also, says Chang Yu, "in order not to be

impeded in your evolutions." The T`UNG TIEN reads, "If THE ENEMY

crosses a river," etc. But in view of the next sentence, this is

almost certainly an interpolation.]

4. When an invading force crosses a river in its onward

march, do not advance to meet it in mid-stream. It will be best

to let half the army get across, and then deliver your attack.

[Li Ch`uan alludes to the great victory won by Han Hsin over

Lung Chu at the Wei River. Turning to the CH`IEN HAN SHU, ch.

34, fol. 6 verso, we find the battle described as follows: "The

two armies were drawn up on opposite sides of the river. In the

night, Han Hsin ordered his men to take some ten thousand sacks

filled with sand and construct a dam higher up. Then, leading

half his army across, he attacked Lung Chu; but after a time,

pretending to have failed in his attempt, he hastily withdrew to

the other bank. Lung Chu was much elated by this unlooked-for

success, and exclaiming: "I felt sure that Han Hsin was really a

coward!" he pursued him and began crossing the river in his turn.

Han Hsin now sent a party to cut open the sandbags, thus

releasing a great volume of water, which swept down and prevented

the greater portion of Lung Chu's army from getting across. He

then turned upon the force which had been cut off, and

annihilated it, Lung Chu himself being amongst the slain. The

rest of the army, on the further bank, also scattered and fled in

all directions.]

5. If you are anxious to fight, you should not go to meet

the invader near a river which he has to cross.

[For fear of preventing his crossing.]

6. Moor your craft higher up than the enemy, and facing the

sun.

[See supra, ss. 2. The repetition of these words in

connection with water is very awkward. Chang Yu has the note:

"Said either of troops marshaled on the river-bank, or of boats

anchored in the stream itself; in either case it is essential to

be higher than the enemy and facing the sun." The other

commentators are not at all explicit.]

Do not move up-stream to meet the enemy.

[Tu Mu says: "As water flows downwards, we must not pitch

our camp on the lower reaches of a river, for fear the enemy

should open the sluices and sweep us away in a flood. Chu-ko Wu-

hou has remarked that 'in river warfare we must not advance

against the stream,' which is as much as to say that our fleet

must not be anchored below that of the enemy, for then they would

be able to take advantage of the current and make short work of

us." There is also the danger, noted by other commentators, that

the enemy may throw poison on the water to be carried down to

us.]

So much for river warfare.

7. In crossing salt-marshes, your sole concern should be to

get over them quickly, without any delay.

[Because of the lack of fresh water, the poor quality of the

herbage, and last but not least, because they are low, flat, and

exposed to attack.]

8. If forced to fight in a salt-marsh, you should have

water and grass near you, and get your back to a clump of trees.

[Li Ch`uan remarks that the ground is less likely to be

treacherous where there are trees, while Tu Mu says that they

will serve to protect the rear.]

So much for operations in salt-marches.

9. In dry, level country, take up an easily accessible

position with rising ground to your right and on your rear,

[Tu Mu quotes T`ai Kung as saying: "An army should have a

stream or a marsh on its left, and a hill or tumulus on its

right."]

so that the danger may be in front, and safety lie behind. So

much for campaigning in flat country.

10. These are the four useful branches of military

knowledge

[Those, namely, concerned with (1) mountains, (2) rivers,

(3) marshes, and (4) plains. Compare Napoleon's "Military

Maxims," no. 1.]

which enabled the Yellow Emperor to vanquish four several

sovereigns.

[Regarding the "Yellow Emperor": Mei Yao-ch`en asks, with

some plausibility, whether there is an error in the text as

nothing is known of Huang Ti having conquered four other

Emperors. The SHIH CHI (ch. 1 ad init.) speaks only of his

victories over Yen Ti and Ch`ih Yu. In the LIU T`AO it is

mentioned that he "fought seventy battles and pacified the

Empire." Ts`ao Kung's explanation is, that the Yellow Emperor

was the first to institute the feudal system of vassals princes,

each of whom (to the number of four) originally bore the title of

Emperor. Li Ch`uan tells us that the art of war originated under

Huang Ti, who received it from his Minister Feng Hou.]

11. All armies prefer high ground to low.

["High Ground," says Mei Yao-ch`en, "is not only more

agreement and salubrious, but more convenient from a military

point of view; low ground is not only damp and unhealthy, but

also disadvantageous for fighting."]

and sunny places to dark.

12. If you are careful of your men,

[Ts`ao Kung says: "Make for fresh water and pasture, where

you can turn out your animals to graze."]

and camp on hard ground, the army will be free from disease of

every kind,

[Chang Yu says: "The dryness of the climate will prevent

the outbreak of illness."]

and this will spell victory.

13. When you come to a hill or a bank, occupy the sunny

side, with the slope on your right rear. Thus you will at once

act for the benefit of your soldiers and utilize the natural

advantages of the ground.

14. When, in consequence of heavy rains up-country, a river

which you wish to ford is swollen and flecked with foam, you must

wait until it subsides.

15. Country in which there are precipitous cliffs with

torrents running between, deep natural hollows,

[The latter defined as "places enclosed on every side by

steep banks, with pools of water at the bottom.]

confined places,

[Defined as "natural pens or prisons" or "places surrounded

by precipices on three sides--easy to get into, but hard to get

out of."]

tangled thickets,

[Defined as "places covered with such dense undergrowth that

spears cannot be used."]

quagmires

[Defined as "low-lying places, so heavy with mud as to be

impassable for chariots and horsemen."]

and crevasses,

[Defined by Mei Yao-ch`en as "a narrow difficult way between

beetling cliffs." Tu Mu's note is "ground covered with trees and

rocks, and intersected by numerous ravines and pitfalls." This

is very vague, but Chia Lin explains it clearly enough as a

defile or narrow pass, and Chang Yu takes much the same view. On

the whole, the weight of the commentators certainly inclines to

the rendering "defile." But the ordinary meaning of the Chinese

in one place is "a crack or fissure" and the fact that the

meaning of the Chinese elsewhere in the sentence indicates

something in the nature of a defile, make me think that Sun Tzu

is here speaking of crevasses.]

should be left with all possible speed and not approached.

16. While we keep away from such places, we should get the

enemy to approach them; while we face them, we should let the

enemy have them on his rear.

17. If in the neighborhood of your camp there should be any

hilly country, ponds surrounded by aquatic grass, hollow basins

filled with reeds, or woods with thick undergrowth, they must be

carefully routed out and searched; for these are places where men

in ambush or insidious spies are likely to be lurking.

[Chang Yu has the note: "We must also be on our guard

against traitors who may lie in close covert, secretly spying out

our weaknesses and overhearing our instructions."]

18. When the enemy is close at hand and remains quiet, he

is relying on the natural strength of his position.

[Here begin Sun Tzu's remarks on the reading of signs, much

of which is so good that it could almost be included in a modern

manual like Gen. Baden-Powell's "Aids to Scouting."]

19. When he keeps aloof and tries to provoke a battle, he

is anxious for the other side to advance.

[Probably because we are in a strong position from which he

wishes to dislodge us. "If he came close up to us, says Tu Mu,

"and tried to force a battle, he would seem to despise us, and

there would be less probability of our responding to the

challenge."]

20. If his place of encampment is easy of access, he is

tendering a bait.

21. Movement amongst the trees of a forest shows that the

enemy is advancing.

[Ts`ao Kung explains this as "felling trees to clear a

passage," and Chang Yu says: "Every man sends out scouts to

climb high places and observe the enemy. If a scout sees that

the trees of a forest are moving and shaking, he may know that

they are being cut down to clear a passage for the enemy's

march."]

The appearance of a number of screens in the midst of thick grass

means that the enemy wants to make us suspicious.

[Tu Yu's explanation, borrowed from Ts`ao Kung's, is as

follows: "The presence of a number of screens or sheds in the

midst of thick vegetation is a sure sign that the enemy has fled

and, fearing pursuit, has constructed these hiding-places in

order to make us suspect an ambush." It appears that these

"screens" were hastily knotted together out of any long grass

which the retreating enemy happened to come across.]

22. The rising of birds in their flight is the sign of an

ambuscade.

[Chang Yu's explanation is doubtless right: "When birds

that are flying along in a straight line suddenly shoot upwards,

it means that soldiers are in ambush at the spot beneath."]

Startled beasts indicate that a sudden attack is coming.

23. When there is dust rising in a high column, it is the

sign of chariots advancing; when the dust is low, but spread over

a wide area, it betokens the approach of infantry.

["High and sharp," or rising to a peak, is of course

somewhat exaggerated as applied to dust. The commentators

explain the phenomenon by saying that horses and chariots, being

heavier than men, raise more dust, and also follow one another in

the same wheel-track, whereas foot-soldiers would be marching in

ranks, many abreast. According to Chang Yu, "every army on the

march must have scouts some way in advance, who on sighting dust

raised by the enemy, will gallop back and report it to the

commander-in-chief." Cf. Gen. Baden-Powell: "As you move along,

say, in a hostile country, your eyes should be looking afar for

the enemy or any signs of him: figures, dust rising, birds

getting up, glitter of arms, etc." [1] ]

When it branches out in different directions, it shows that

parties have been sent to collect firewood. A few clouds of dust

moving to and fro signify that the army is encamping.

[Chang Yu says: "In apportioning the defenses for a

cantonment, light horse will be sent out to survey the position

and ascertain the weak and strong points all along its

circumference. Hence the small quantity of dust and its

motion."]

24. Humble words and increased preparations are signs that

the enemy is about to advance.

["As though they stood in great fear of us," says Tu Mu.

"Their object is to make us contemptuous and careless, after

which they will attack us." Chang Yu alludes to the story of

T`ien Tan of the Ch`i-mo against the Yen forces, led by Ch`i

Chieh. In ch. 82 of the SHIH CHI we read: "T`ien Tan openly

said: 'My only fear is that the Yen army may cut off the noses

of their Ch`i prisoners and place them in the front rank to fight

against us; that would be the undoing of our city.' The other

side being informed of this speech, at once acted on the

suggestion; but those within the city were enraged at seeing

their fellow-countrymen thus mutilated, and fearing only lest

they should fall into the enemy's hands, were nerved to defend

themselves more obstinately than ever. Once again T`ien Tan sent

back converted spies who reported these words to the enemy:

"What I dread most is that the men of Yen may dig up the

ancestral tombs outside the town, and by inflicting this

indignity on our forefathers cause us to become faint-hearted.'

Forthwith the besiegers dug up all the graves and burned the

corpses lying in them. And the inhabitants of Chi-mo, witnessing

the outrage from the city-walls, wept passionately and were all

impatient to go out and fight, their fury being increased

tenfold. T`ien Tan knew then that his soldiers were ready for

any enterprise. But instead of a sword, he himself too a

mattock in his hands, and ordered others to be distributed

amongst his best warriors, while the ranks were filled up with

their wives and concubines. He then served out all the remaining

rations and bade his men eat their fill. The regular soldiers

were told to keep out of sight, and the walls were manned with

the old and weaker men and with women. This done, envoys were

dispatched to the enemy's camp to arrange terms of surrender,

whereupon the Yen army began shouting for joy. T`ien Tan also

collected 20,000 ounces of silver from the people, and got the

wealthy citizens of Chi-mo to send it to the Yen general with the

prayer that, when the town capitulated, he would allow their

homes to be plundered or their women to be maltreated. Ch`i

Chieh, in high good humor, granted their prayer; but his army now

became increasingly slack and careless. Meanwhile, T`ien Tan got

together a thousand oxen, decked them with pieces of red silk,

painted their bodies, dragon-like, with colored stripes, and

fastened sharp blades on their horns and well-greased rushes on

their tails. When night came on, he lighted the ends of the

rushes, and drove the oxen through a number of holes which he had

pierced in the walls, backing them up with a force of 5000 picked

warriors. The animals, maddened with pain, dashed furiously

into the enemy's camp where they caused the utmost confusion and

dismay; for their tails acted as torches, showing up the hideous

pattern on their bodies, and the weapons on their horns killed or

wounded any with whom they came into contact. In the meantime,

the band of 5000 had crept up with gags in their mouths, and now

threw themselves on the enemy. At the same moment a frightful

din arose in the city itself, all those that remained behind

making as much noise as possible by banging drums and

hammering on bronze vessels, until heaven and earth were convulsed

by the uproar. Terror-stricken, the Yen army fled in disorder, hotly

pursued by the men of Ch`i, who succeeded in slaying their

general Ch`i Chien.... The result of the battle was the ultimate

recovery of some seventy cities which had belonged to the Ch`i

State."]

Violent language and driving forward as if to the attack are

signs that he will retreat.

25. When the light chariots come out first and take up a

position on the wings, it is a sign that the enemy is forming for

battle.

26. Peace proposals unaccompanied by a sworn covenant

indicate a plot.

[The reading here is uncertain. Li Ch`uan indicates "a

treaty confirmed by oaths and hostages." Wang Hsi and Chang Yu,

on the other hand, simply say "without reason," "on a frivolous

pretext."]

27. When there is much running about

[Every man hastening to his proper place under his own

regimental banner.]

and the soldiers fall into rank, it means that the critical

moment has come.

28. When some are seen advancing and some retreating, it is

a lure.

29. When the soldiers stand leaning on their spears, they

are faint from want of food.

30. If those who are sent to draw water begin by drinking

themselves, the army is suffering from thirst.

[As Tu Mu remarks: "One may know the condition of a whole

army from the behavior of a single man."]

31. If the enemy sees an advantage to be gained and makes

no effort to secure it, the soldiers are exhausted.

32. If birds gather on any spot, it is unoccupied.

[A useful fact to bear in mind when, for instance, as Ch`en

Hao says, the enemy has secretly abandoned his camp.]

Clamor by night betokens nervousness.

33. If there is disturbance in the camp, the general's

authority is weak. If the banners and flags are shifted about,

sedition is afoot. If the officers are angry, it means that the

men are weary.

[Tu Mu understands the sentence differently: "If all the

officers of an army are angry with their general, it means that

they are broken with fatigue" owing to the exertions which he has

demanded from them.]

34. When an army feeds its horses with grain and kills its

cattle for food,

[In the ordinary course of things, the men would be fed on

grain and the horses chiefly on grass.]

and when the men do not hang their cooking-pots over the camp-

fires, showing that they will not return to their tents, you may

know that they are determined to fight to the death.

[I may quote here the illustrative passage from the HOU HAN

SHU, ch. 71, given in abbreviated form by the P`EI WEN YUN FU:

"The rebel Wang Kuo of Liang was besieging the town of Ch`en-

ts`ang, and Huang-fu Sung, who was in supreme command, and

Tung Cho were sent out against him. The latter pressed for hasty

measures, but Sung turned a deaf ear to his counsel. At last the

rebels were utterly worn out, and began to throw down their

weapons of their own accord. Sung was not advancing to the

attack, but Cho said: 'It is a principle of war not to pursue

desperate men and not to press a retreating host.' Sung

answered: 'That does not apply here. What I am about to attack

is a jaded army, not a retreating host; with disciplined troops I

am falling on a disorganized multitude, not a band of desperate

men.' Thereupon he advances to the attack unsupported by his

colleague, and routed the enemy, Wang Kuo being slain."]

35. The sight of men whispering together in small knots or

speaking in subdued tones points to disaffection amongst the rank

and file.

36. Too frequent rewards signify that the enemy is at the

end of his resources;

[Because, when an army is hard pressed, as Tu Mu says, there

is always a fear of mutiny, and lavish rewards are given to keep

the men in good temper.]

too many punishments betray a condition of dire distress.

[Because in such case discipline becomes relaxed, and

unwonted severity is necessary to keep the men to their duty.]

37. To begin by bluster, but afterwards to take fright at

the enemy's numbers, shows a supreme lack of intelligence.

[I follow the interpretation of Ts`ao Kung, also adopted by

Li Ch`uan, Tu Mu, and Chang Yu. Another possible meaning set

forth by Tu Yu, Chia Lin, Mei Tao-ch`en and Wang Hsi, is: "The

general who is first tyrannical towards his men, and then in

terror lest they should mutiny, etc." This would connect the

sentence with what went before about rewards and punishments.]

38. When envoys are sent with compliments in their mouths,

it is a sign that the enemy wishes for a truce.

[Tu Mu says: "If the enemy open friendly relations be

sending hostages, it is a sign that they are anxious for an

armistice, either because their strength is exhausted or for some

other reason." But it hardly needs a Sun Tzu to draw such an

obvious inference.]

39. If the enemy's troops march up angrily and remain

facing ours for a long time without either joining battle or

taking themselves off again, the situation is one that demands

great vigilance and circumspection.

[Ts`ao Kung says a maneuver of this sort may be only a ruse

to gain time for an unexpected flank attack or the laying of an

ambush.]

40. If our troops are no more in number than the enemy,

that is amply sufficient; it only means that no direct attack can

be made.

[Literally, "no martial advance." That is to say, CHENG

tactics and frontal attacks must be eschewed, and stratagem

resorted to instead.]

What we can do is simply to concentrate all our available

strength, keep a close watch on the enemy, and obtain

reinforcements.

[This is an obscure sentence, and none of the commentators

succeed in squeezing very good sense out of it. I follow Li

Ch`uan, who appears to offer the simplest explanation: "Only the

side that gets more men will win." Fortunately we have Chang Yu

to expound its meaning to us in language which is lucidity

itself: "When the numbers are even, and no favorable opening

presents itself, although we may not be strong enough to deliver

a sustained attack, we can find additional recruits amongst our

sutlers and camp-followers, and then, concentrating our forces

and keeping a close watch on the enemy, contrive to snatch the

victory. But we must avoid borrowing foreign soldiers to help

us." He then quotes from Wei Liao Tzu, ch. 3: "The nominal

strength of mercenary troops may be 100,000, but their real value

will be not more than half that figure."]

41. He who exercises no forethought but makes light of his

opponents is sure to be captured by them.

[Ch`en Hao, quoting from the TSO CHUAN, says: "If bees and

scorpions carry poison, how much more will a hostile state! Even

a puny opponent, then, should not be treated with contempt."]

42. If soldiers are punished before they have grown

attached to you, they will not prove submissive; and, unless

submissive, then will be practically useless. If, when the

soldiers have become attached to you, punishments are not

enforced, they will still be unless.

43. Therefore soldiers must be treated in the first

instance with humanity, but kept under control by means of iron

discipline.

[Yen Tzu [B.C. 493] said of Ssu-ma Jang-chu: "His civil

virtues endeared him to the people; his martial prowess kept his

enemies in awe." Cf. Wu Tzu, ch. 4 init.: "The ideal commander

unites culture with a warlike temper; the profession of arms

requires a combination of hardness and tenderness."]

This is a certain road to victory.

44. If in training soldiers commands are habitually

enforced, the army will be well-disciplined; if not, its

discipline will be bad.

45. If a general shows confidence in his men but always

insists on his orders being obeyed,

[Tu Mu says: "A general ought in time of peace to show

kindly confidence in his men and also make his authority

respected, so that when they come to face the enemy, orders may

be executed and discipline maintained, because they all trust and

look up to him." What Sun Tzu has said in ss. 44, however, would

lead one rather to expect something like this: "If a general is

always confident that his orders will be carried out," etc."]

the gain will be mutual.

[Chang Yu says: "The general has confidence in the men

under his command, and the men are docile, having confidence in

him. Thus the gain is mutual" He quotes a pregnant sentence

from Wei Liao Tzu, ch. 4: "The art of giving orders is not to

try to rectify minor blunders and not to be swayed by petty

doubts." Vacillation and fussiness are the surest means of

sapping the confidence of an army.]

[1] "Aids to Scouting," p. 26.