IV. TACTICAL DISPOSITIONS

IV. TACTICAL DISPOSITIONS

[Ts`ao Kung explains the Chinese meaning of the words for

the title of this chapter: "marching and countermarching on the

part of the two armies with a view to discovering each other's

condition." Tu Mu says: "It is through the dispositions of an

army that its condition may be discovered. Conceal your

dispositions, and your condition will remain secret, which leads

to victory,; show your dispositions, and your condition will

become patent, which leads to defeat." Wang Hsi remarks that the

good general can "secure success by modifying his tactics to meet

those of the enemy."]

1. Sun Tzu said: The good fighters of old first put

themselves beyond the possibility of defeat, and then waited for

an opportunity of defeating the enemy.

2. To secure ourselves against defeat lies in our own

hands, but the opportunity of defeating the enemy is provided by

the enemy himself.

[That is, of course, by a mistake on the enemy's part.]

3. Thus the good fighter is able to secure himself against

defeat,

[Chang Yu says this is done, "By concealing the disposition

of his troops, covering up his tracks, and taking unremitting

precautions."]

but cannot make certain of defeating the enemy.

4. Hence the saying: One may KNOW how to conquer without

being able to DO it.

5. Security against defeat implies defensive tactics;

ability to defeat the enemy means taking the offensive.

[I retain the sense found in a similar passage in ss. 1-3,

in spite of the fact that the commentators are all against me.

The meaning they give, "He who cannot conquer takes the

defensive," is plausible enough.]

6. Standing on the defensive indicates insufficient

strength; attacking, a superabundance of strength.

7. The general who is skilled in defense hides in the most

secret recesses of the earth;

[Literally, "hides under the ninth earth," which is a

metaphor indicating the utmost secrecy and concealment, so that

the enemy may not know his whereabouts."]

he who is skilled in attack flashes forth from the topmost

heights of heaven.

[Another metaphor, implying that he falls on his adversary

like a thunderbolt, against which there is no time to prepare.

This is the opinion of most of the commentators.]

Thus on the one hand we have ability to protect ourselves; on the

other, a victory that is complete.

8. To see victory only when it is within the ken of the

common herd is not the acme of excellence.

[As Ts`ao Kung remarks, "the thing is to see the plant

before it has germinated," to foresee the event before the action

has begun. Li Ch`uan alludes to the story of Han Hsin who, when

about to attack the vastly superior army of Chao, which was

strongly entrenched in the city of Ch`eng-an, said to his

officers: "Gentlemen, we are going to annihilate the enemy, and

shall meet again at dinner." The officers hardly took his words

seriously, and gave a very dubious assent. But Han Hsin had

already worked out in his mind the details of a clever stratagem,

whereby, as he foresaw, he was able to capture the city and

inflict a crushing defeat on his adversary."]

9. Neither is it the acme of excellence if you fight and

conquer and the whole Empire says, "Well done!"

[True excellence being, as Tu Mu says: "To plan secretly,

to move surreptitiously, to foil the enemy's intentions and balk

his schemes, so that at last the day may be won without shedding

a drop of blood." Sun Tzu reserves his approbation for things

that "the world's coarse thumb And finger fail to plumb."]

10. To lift an autumn hair is no sign of great strength;

["Autumn" hair" is explained as the fur of a hare, which is

finest in autumn, when it begins to grow afresh. The phrase is a

very common one in Chinese writers.]

to see the sun and moon is no sign of sharp sight; to hear the

noise of thunder is no sign of a quick ear.

[Ho Shih gives as real instances of strength, sharp sight

and quick hearing: Wu Huo, who could lift a tripod weighing 250

stone; Li Chu, who at a distance of a hundred paces could see

objects no bigger than a mustard seed; and Shih K`uang, a blind

musician who could hear the footsteps of a mosquito.]

11. What the ancients called a clever fighter is one who

not only wins, but excels in winning with ease.

[The last half is literally "one who, conquering, excels in

easy conquering." Mei Yao-ch`en says: "He who only sees the

obvious, wins his battles with difficulty; he who looks below the

surface of things, wins with ease."]

12. Hence his victories bring him neither reputation for

wisdom nor credit for courage.

[Tu Mu explains this very well: "Inasmuch as his victories

are gained over circumstances that have not come to light, the

world as large knows nothing of them, and he wins no reputation

for wisdom; inasmuch as the hostile state submits before there

has been any bloodshed, he receives no credit for courage."]

13. He wins his battles by making no mistakes.

[Ch`en Hao says: "He plans no superfluous marches, he

devises no futile attacks." The connection of ideas is thus

explained by Chang Yu: "One who seeks to conquer by sheer

strength, clever though he may be at winning pitched battles, is

also liable on occasion to be vanquished; whereas he who can look

into the future and discern conditions that are not yet manifest,

will never make a blunder and therefore invariably win."]

Making no mistakes is what establishes the certainty of victory,

for it means conquering an enemy that is already defeated.

14. Hence the skillful fighter puts himself into a position

which makes defeat impossible, and does not miss the moment for

defeating the enemy.

[A "counsel of perfection" as Tu Mu truly observes.

"Position" need not be confined to the actual ground occupied by

the troops. It includes all the arrangements and preparations

which a wise general will make to increase the safety of his

army.]

15. Thus it is that in war the victorious strategist only

seeks battle after the victory has been won, whereas he who is

destined to defeat first fights and afterwards looks for victory.

[Ho Shih thus expounds the paradox: "In warfare, first lay

plans which will ensure victory, and then lead your army to

battle; if you will not begin with stratagem but rely on brute

strength alone, victory will no longer be assured."]

16. The consummate leader cultivates the moral law, and

strictly adheres to method and discipline; thus it is in his

power to control success.

17. In respect of military method, we have, firstly,

Measurement; secondly, Estimation of quantity; thirdly,

Calculation; fourthly, Balancing of chances; fifthly, Victory.

18. Measurement owes its existence to Earth; Estimation of

quantity to Measurement; Calculation to Estimation of quantity;

Balancing of chances to Calculation; and Victory to Balancing of

chances.

[It is not easy to distinguish the four terms very clearly

in the Chinese. The first seems to be surveying and measurement

of the ground, which enable us to form an estimate of the enemy's

strength, and to make calculations based on the data thus

obtained; we are thus led to a general weighing-up, or comparison

of the enemy's chances with our own; if the latter turn the

scale, then victory ensues. The chief difficulty lies in third

term, which in the Chinese some commentators take as a

calculation of NUMBERS, thereby making it nearly synonymous with

the second term. Perhaps the second term should be thought of as

a consideration of the enemy's general position or condition,

while the third term is the estimate of his numerical strength.

On the other hand, Tu Mu says: "The question of relative

strength having been settled, we can bring the varied resources

of cunning into play." Ho Shih seconds this interpretation, but

weakens it. However, it points to the third term as being a

calculation of numbers.]

19. A victorious army opposed to a routed one, is as a

pound's weight placed in the scale against a single grain.

[Literally, "a victorious army is like an I (20 oz.) weighed

against a SHU (1/24 oz.); a routed army is a SHU weighed against

an I." The point is simply the enormous advantage which a

disciplined force, flushed with victory, has over one demoralized

by defeat." Legge, in his note on Mencius, I. 2. ix. 2, makes

the I to be 24 Chinese ounces, and corrects Chu Hsi's statement

that it equaled 20 oz. only. But Li Ch`uan of the T`ang dynasty

here gives the same figure as Chu Hsi.]

20. The onrush of a conquering force is like the bursting

of pent-up waters into a chasm a thousand fathoms deep.