VII. MANEUVERING

VII. MANEUVERING

1. Sun Tzu said: In war, the general receives his commands

from the sovereign.

2. Having collected an army and concentrated his forces, he

must blend and harmonize the different elements thereof before

pitching his camp.

["Chang Yu says: "the establishment of harmony and

confidence between the higher and lower ranks before venturing

into the field;" and he quotes a saying of Wu Tzu (chap. 1 ad

init.): "Without harmony in the State, no military expedition

can be undertaken; without harmony in the army, no battle array

can be formed." In an historical romance Sun Tzu is represented

as saying to Wu Yuan: "As a general rule, those who are waging

war should get rid of all the domestic troubles before proceeding

to attack the external foe."]

3. After that, comes tactical maneuvering, than which there

is nothing more difficult.

[I have departed slightly from the traditional

interpretation of Ts`ao Kung, who says: "From the time of

receiving the sovereign's instructions until our encampment over

against the enemy, the tactics to be pursued are most difficult."

It seems to me that the tactics or maneuvers can hardly be said

to begin until the army has sallied forth and encamped, and

Ch`ien Hao's note gives color to this view: "For levying,

concentrating, harmonizing and entrenching an army, there are

plenty of old rules which will serve. The real difficulty comes

when we engage in tactical operations." Tu Yu also observes that

"the great difficulty is to be beforehand with the enemy in

seizing favorable position."]

The difficulty of tactical maneuvering consists in turning the

devious into the direct, and misfortune into gain.

[This sentence contains one of those highly condensed and

somewhat enigmatical expressions of which Sun Tzu is so fond.

This is how it is explained by Ts`ao Kung: "Make it appear that

you are a long way off, then cover the distance rapidly and

arrive on the scene before your opponent." Tu Mu says:

"Hoodwink the enemy, so that he may be remiss and leisurely while

you are dashing along with utmost speed." Ho Shih gives a

slightly different turn: "Although you may have difficult ground

to traverse and natural obstacles to encounter this is a drawback

which can be turned into actual advantage by celerity of

movement." Signal examples of this saying are afforded by the

two famous passages across the Alps--that of Hannibal, which laid

Italy at his mercy, and that of Napoleon two thousand years

later, which resulted in the great victory of Marengo.]

4. Thus, to take a long and circuitous route, after

enticing the enemy out of the way, and though starting after him,

to contrive to reach the goal before him, shows knowledge of the

artifice of DEVIATION.

[Tu Mu cites the famous march of Chao She in 270 B.C. to

relieve the town of O-yu, which was closely invested by a Ch`in

army. The King of Chao first consulted Lien P`o on the

advisability of attempting a relief, but the latter thought the

distance too great, and the intervening country too rugged and

difficult. His Majesty then turned to Chao She, who fully

admitted the hazardous nature of the march, but finally said:

"We shall be like two rats fighting in a whole--and the pluckier

one will win!" So he left the capital with his army, but had

only gone a distance of 30 LI when he stopped and began

throwing up entrenchments. For 28 days he continued

strengthening his fortifications, and took care that spies should

carry the intelligence to the enemy. The Ch`in general was

overjoyed, and attributed his adversary's tardiness to the fact

that the beleaguered city was in the Han State, and thus not

actually part of Chao territory. But the spies had no sooner

departed than Chao She began a forced march lasting for two days

and one night, and arrive on the scene of action with such

astonishing rapidity that he was able to occupy a commanding

position on the "North hill" before the enemy had got wind of his

movements. A crushing defeat followed for the Ch`in forces, who

were obliged to raise the siege of O-yu in all haste and retreat

across the border.]

5. Maneuvering with an army is advantageous; with an

undisciplined multitude, most dangerous.

[I adopt the reading of the T`UNG TIEN, Cheng Yu-hsien and

the T`U SHU, since they appear to apply the exact nuance required

in order to make sense. The commentators using the standard text

take this line to mean that maneuvers may be profitable, or they

may be dangerous: it all depends on the ability of the general.]

6. If you set a fully equipped army in march in order to

snatch an advantage, the chances are that you will be too late.

On the other hand, to detach a flying column for the purpose

involves the sacrifice of its baggage and stores.

[Some of the Chinese text is unintelligible to the Chinese

commentators, who paraphrase the sentence. I submit my own

rendering without much enthusiasm, being convinced that there is

some deep-seated corruption in the text. On the whole, it is

clear that Sun Tzu does not approve of a lengthy march being

undertaken without supplies. Cf. infra, ss. 11.]

7. Thus, if you order your men to roll up their buff-coats,

and make forced marches without halting day or night, covering

double the usual distance at a stretch,

[The ordinary day's march, according to Tu Mu, was 30 LI;

but on one occasion, when pursuing Liu Pei, Ts`ao Ts`ao is said

to have covered the incredible distance of 300 _li_ within

twenty-four hours.]

doing a hundred LI in order to wrest an advantage, the leaders of

all your three divisions will fall into the hands of the enemy.

8. The stronger men will be in front, the jaded ones will

fall behind, and on this plan only one-tenth of your army will

reach its destination.

[The moral is, as Ts`ao Kung and others point out: Don't

march a hundred LI to gain a tactical advantage, either with or

without impedimenta. Maneuvers of this description should be

confined to short distances. Stonewall Jackson said: "The

hardships of forced marches are often more painful than the

dangers of battle." He did not often call upon his troops for

extraordinary exertions. It was only when he intended a

surprise, or when a rapid retreat was imperative, that he

sacrificed everything for speed. [1] ]

9. If you march fifty LI in order to outmaneuver the enemy,

you will lose the leader of your first division, and only half

your force will reach the goal.

[Literally, "the leader of the first division will be

TORN AWAY."]

10. If you march thirty LI with the same object, two-thirds

of your army will arrive.

[In the T`UNG TIEN is added: "From this we may know the

difficulty of maneuvering."]

11. We may take it then that an army without its baggage-

train is lost; without provisions it is lost; without bases of

supply it is lost.

[I think Sun Tzu meant "stores accumulated in depots." But

Tu Yu says "fodder and the like," Chang Yu says "Goods in

general," and Wang Hsi says "fuel, salt, foodstuffs, etc."]

12. We cannot enter into alliances until we are acquainted

with the designs of our neighbors.

13. We are not fit to lead an army on the march unless we

are familiar with the face of the country--its mountains and

forests, its pitfalls and precipices, its marshes and swamps.

14. We shall be unable to turn natural advantage to account

unless we make use of local guides.

[ss. 12-14 are repeated in chap. XI. ss. 52.]

15. In war, practice dissimulation, and you will succeed.

[In the tactics of Turenne, deception of the enemy,

especially as to the numerical strength of his troops, took a

very prominent position. [2] ]

16. Whether to concentrate or to divide your troops, must

be decided by circumstances.

17. Let your rapidity be that of the wind,

[The simile is doubly appropriate, because the wind is not

only swift but, as Mei Yao-ch`en points out, "invisible and

leaves no tracks."]

your compactness that of the forest.

[Meng Shih comes nearer to the mark in his note: "When

slowly marching, order and ranks must be preserved"--so as to

guard against surprise attacks. But natural forest do not grow

in rows, whereas they do generally possess the quality of density

or compactness.]

18. In raiding and plundering be like fire,

[Cf. SHIH CHING, IV. 3. iv. 6: "Fierce as a blazing fire

which no man can check."]

is immovability like a mountain.

[That is, when holding a position from which the enemy is

trying to dislodge you, or perhaps, as Tu Yu says, when he is

trying to entice you into a trap.]

19. Let your plans be dark and impenetrable as night, and

when you move, fall like a thunderbolt.

[Tu Yu quotes a saying of T`ai Kung which has passed into a

proverb: "You cannot shut your ears to the thunder or your eyes

to the lighting--so rapid are they." Likewise, an attack should

be made so quickly that it cannot be parried.]

20. When you plunder a countryside, let the spoil be

divided amongst your men;

[Sun Tzu wishes to lessen the abuses of indiscriminate

plundering by insisting that all booty shall be thrown into a

common stock, which may afterwards be fairly divided amongst

all.]

when you capture new territory, cut it up into allotments for the

benefit of the soldiery.

[Ch`en Hao says "quarter your soldiers on the land, and let

them sow and plant it." It is by acting on this principle, and

harvesting the lands they invaded, that the Chinese have

succeeded in carrying out some of their most memorable and

triumphant expeditions, such as that of Pan Ch`ao who penetrated

to the Caspian, and in more recent years, those of Fu-k`ang-an

and Tso Tsung-t`ang.]

21. Ponder and deliberate before you make a move.

[Chang Yu quotes Wei Liao Tzu as saying that we must not

break camp until we have gained the resisting power of the enemy

and the cleverness of the opposing general. Cf. the "seven

comparisons" in I. ss. 13.]

22. He will conquer who has learnt the artifice of

deviation.

[See supra, SS. 3, 4.]

Such is the art of maneuvering.

[With these words, the chapter would naturally come to an

end. But there now follows a long appendix in the shape of an

extract from an earlier book on War, now lost, but apparently

extant at the time when Sun Tzu wrote. The style of this

fragment is not noticeable different from that of Sun Tzu

himself, but no commentator raises a doubt as to its

genuineness.]

23. The Book of Army Management says:

[It is perhaps significant that none of the earlier

commentators give us any information about this work. Mei Yao-

Ch`en calls it "an ancient military classic," and Wang Hsi, "an

old book on war." Considering the enormous amount of fighting

that had gone on for centuries before Sun Tzu's time between the

various kingdoms and principalities of China, it is not in itself

improbable that a collection of military maxims should have been

made and written down at some earlier period.]

On the field of battle,

[Implied, though not actually in the Chinese.]

the spoken word does not carry far enough: hence the institution

of gongs and drums. Nor can ordinary objects be seen clearly

enough: hence the institution of banners and flags.

24. Gongs and drums, banners and flags, are means whereby

the ears and eyes of the host may be focused on one particular

point.

[Chang Yu says: "If sight and hearing converge

simultaneously on the same object, the evolutions of as many as a

million soldiers will be like those of a single man."!]

25. The host thus forming a single united body, is it

impossible either for the brave to advance alone, or for the

cowardly to retreat alone.

[Chuang Yu quotes a saying: "Equally guilty are those who

advance against orders and those who retreat against orders." Tu

Mu tells a story in this connection of Wu Ch`i, when he was

fighting against the Ch`in State. Before the battle had begun,

one of his soldiers, a man of matchless daring, sallied forth by

himself, captured two heads from the enemy, and returned to camp.

Wu Ch`i had the man instantly executed, whereupon an officer

ventured to remonstrate, saying: "This man was a good soldier,

and ought not to have been beheaded." Wu Ch`i replied: "I fully

believe he was a good soldier, but I had him beheaded because he

acted without orders."]

This is the art of handling large masses of men.

26. In night-fighting, then, make much use of signal-fires

and drums, and in fighting by day, of flags and banners, as a

means of influencing the ears and eyes of your army.

[Ch`en Hao alludes to Li Kuang-pi's night ride to Ho-yang at

the head of 500 mounted men; they made such an imposing display

with torches, that though the rebel leader Shih Ssu-ming had a

large army, he did not dare to dispute their passage.]

27. A whole army may be robbed of its spirit;

["In war," says Chang Yu, "if a spirit of anger can be made

to pervade all ranks of an army at one and the same time, its

onset will be irresistible. Now the spirit of the enemy's

soldiers will be keenest when they have newly arrived on the

scene, and it is therefore our cue not to fight at once, but to

wait until their ardor and enthusiasm have worn off, and then

strike. It is in this way that they may be robbed of their keen

spirit." Li Ch`uan and others tell an anecdote (to be found in

the TSO CHUAN, year 10, ss. 1) of Ts`ao Kuei, a protege of Duke

Chuang of Lu. The latter State was attacked by Ch`i, and the

duke was about to join battle at Ch`ang-cho, after the first roll

of the enemy's drums, when Ts`ao said: "Not just yet." Only

after their drums had beaten for the third time, did he give the

word for attack. Then they fought, and the men of Ch`i were

utterly defeated. Questioned afterwards by the Duke as to the

meaning of his delay, Ts`ao Kuei replied: "In battle, a

courageous spirit is everything. Now the first roll of the drum

tends to create this spirit, but with the second it is already on

the wane, and after the third it is gone altogether. I attacked

when their spirit was gone and ours was at its height. Hence our

victory." Wu Tzu (chap. 4) puts "spirit" first among the "four

important influences" in war, and continues: "The value of a

whole army--a mighty host of a million men--is dependent on one

man alone: such is the influence of spirit!"]

a commander-in-chief may be robbed of his presence of mind.

[Chang Yu says: "Presence of mind is the general's most

important asset. It is the quality which enables him to

discipline disorder and to inspire courage into the panic-

stricken." The great general Li Ching (A.D. 571-649) has a

saying: "Attacking does not merely consist in assaulting walled

cities or striking at an army in battle array; it must include

the art of assailing the enemy's mental equilibrium."]

28. Now a solider's spirit is keenest in the morning;

[Always provided, I suppose, that he has had breakfast. At

the battle of the Trebia, the Romans were foolishly allowed to

fight fasting, whereas Hannibal's men had breakfasted at

their leisure. See Livy, XXI, liv. 8, lv. 1 and 8.]

by noonday it has begun to flag; and in the evening, his mind is

bent only on returning to camp.

29. A clever general, therefore, avoids an army when its

spirit is keen, but attacks it when it is sluggish and inclined

to return. This is the art of studying moods.

30. Disciplined and calm, to await the appearance of

disorder and hubbub amongst the enemy:--this is the art of

retaining self-possession.

31. To be near the goal while the enemy is still far from

it, to wait at ease while the enemy is toiling and struggling, to

be well-fed while the enemy is famished:--this is the art of

husbanding one's strength.

32. To refrain from intercepting an enemy whose banners are

in perfect order, to refrain from attacking an army drawn up in

calm and confident array:--this is the art of studying

circumstances.

33. It is a military axiom not to advance uphill against

the enemy, nor to oppose him when he comes downhill.

34. Do not pursue an enemy who simulates flight; do not

attack soldiers whose temper is keen.

35. Do not swallow bait offered by the enemy.

[Li Ch`uan and Tu Mu, with extraordinary inability to see a

metaphor, take these words quite literally of food and drink that

have been poisoned by the enemy. Ch`en Hao and Chang Yu

carefully point out that the saying has a wider application.]

Do not interfere with an army that is returning home.

[The commentators explain this rather singular piece of

advice by saying that a man whose heart is set on returning home

will fight to the death against any attempt to bar his way, and

is therefore too dangerous an opponent to be tackled. Chang Yu

quotes the words of Han Hsin: "Invincible is the soldier who

hath his desire and returneth homewards." A marvelous tale is

told of Ts`ao Ts`ao's courage and resource in ch. 1 of the SAN

KUO CHI: In 198 A.D., he was besieging Chang Hsiu in Jang, when

Liu Piao sent reinforcements with a view to cutting off Ts`ao's

retreat. The latter was obligbed to draw off his troops, only to

find himself hemmed in between two enemies, who were guarding

each outlet of a narrow pass in which he had engaged himself. In

this desperate plight Ts`ao waited until nightfall, when he bored

a tunnel into the mountain side and laid an ambush in it. As

soon as the whole army had passed by, the hidden troops fell on

his rear, while Ts`ao himself turned and met his pursuers in

front, so that they were thrown into confusion and annihilated.

Ts`ao Ts`ao said afterwards: "The brigands tried to check my

army in its retreat and brought me to battle in a desperate

position: hence I knew how to overcome them."]

36. When you surround an army, leave an outlet free.

[This does not mean that the enemy is to be allowed to

escape. The object, as Tu Mu puts it, is "to make him believe

that there is a road to safety, and thus prevent his fighting

with the courage of despair." Tu Mu adds pleasantly: "After

that, you may crush him."]

Do not press a desperate foe too hard.

[Ch`en Hao quotes the saying: "Birds and beasts when

brought to bay will use their claws and teeth." Chang Yu says:

"If your adversary has burned his boats and destroyed his

cooking-pots, and is ready to stake all on the issue of a battle,

he must not be pushed to extremities." Ho Shih illustrates the

meaning by a story taken from the life of Yen-ch`ing. That

general, together with his colleague Tu Chung-wei was surrounded

by a vastly superior army of Khitans in the year 945 A.D. The

country was bare and desert-like, and the little Chinese force

was soon in dire straits for want of water. The wells they bored

ran dry, and the men were reduced to squeezing lumps of mud and

sucking out the moisture. Their ranks thinned rapidly, until at

last Fu Yen-ch`ing exclaimed: "We are desperate men. Far better

to die for our country than to go with fettered hands into

captivity!" A strong gale happened to be blowing from the

northeast and darkening the air with dense clouds of sandy dust.

To Chung-wei was for waiting until this had abated before

deciding on a final attack; but luckily another officer, Li Shou-

cheng by name, was quicker to see an opportunity, and said:

"They are many and we are few, but in the midst of this sandstorm

our numbers will not be discernible; victory will go to the

strenuous fighter, and the wind will be our best ally."

Accordingly, Fu Yen-ch`ing made a sudden and wholly unexpected

onslaught with his cavalry, routed the barbarians and succeeded

in breaking through to safety.]

37. Such is the art of warfare.

[1] See Col. Henderson, op. cit. vol. I. p. 426.

[2] For a number of maxims on this head, see "Marshal Turenne"

(Longmans, 1907), p. 29.