VIII. VARIATION IN TACTICS

VIII. VARIATION IN TACTICS

[The heading means literally "The Nine Variations," but as

Sun Tzu does not appear to enumerate these, and as, indeed, he

has already told us (V SS. 6-11) that such deflections from the

ordinary course are practically innumerable, we have little

option but to follow Wang Hsi, who says that "Nine" stands for an

indefinitely large number. "All it means is that in warfare we

ought to very our tactics to the utmost degree.... I do not know

what Ts`ao Kung makes these Nine Variations out to be, but it has

been suggested that they are connected with the Nine Situations"

- of chapt. XI. This is the view adopted by Chang Yu. The only

other alternative is to suppose that something has been lost--a

supposition to which the unusual shortness of the chapter lends

some weight.]

1. Sun Tzu said: In war, the general receives his

commands from the sovereign, collects his army and concentrates

his forces.

[Repeated from VII. ss. 1, where it is certainly more in

place. It may have been interpolated here merely in order to

supply a beginning to the chapter.]

2. When in difficult country, do not encamp. In country

where high roads intersect, join hands with your allies. Do not

linger in dangerously isolated positions.

[The last situation is not one of the Nine Situations as

given in the beginning of chap. XI, but occurs later on (ibid.

ss. 43. q.v.). Chang Yu defines this situation as being situated

across the frontier, in hostile territory. Li Ch`uan says it is

"country in which there are no springs or wells, flocks or herds,

vegetables or firewood;" Chia Lin, "one of gorges, chasms and

precipices, without a road by which to advance."]

In hemmed-in situations, you must resort to stratagem. In

desperate position, you must fight.

3. There are roads which must not be followed,

["Especially those leading through narrow defiles," says Li

Ch`uan, "where an ambush is to be feared."]

armies which must be not attacked,

[More correctly, perhaps, "there are times when an army must

not be attacked." Ch`en Hao says: "When you see your way to

obtain a rival advantage, but are powerless to inflict a real

defeat, refrain from attacking, for fear of overtaxing your men's

strength."]

towns which must be besieged,

[Cf. III. ss. 4 Ts`ao Kung gives an interesting

illustration from his own experience. When invading the

territory of Hsu-chou, he ignored the city of Hua-pi, which lay

directly in his path, and pressed on into the heart of the

country. This excellent strategy was rewarded by the subsequent

capture of no fewer than fourteen important district cities.

Chang Yu says: "No town should be attacked which, if taken,

cannot be held, or if left alone, will not cause any trouble."

Hsun Ying, when urged to attack Pi-yang, replied: "The city is

small and well-fortified; even if I succeed intaking it, it will

be no great feat of arms; whereas if I fail, I shall make myself

a laughing-stock." In the seventeenth century, sieges still

formed a large proportion of war. It was Turenne who directed

attention to the importance of marches, countermarches and

maneuvers. He said: "It is a great mistake to waste men in

taking a town when the same expenditure of soldiers will gain a

province." [1] ]

positions which must not be contested, commands of the sovereign

which must not be obeyed.

[This is a hard saying for the Chinese, with their reverence

for authority, and Wei Liao Tzu (quoted by Tu Mu) is moved to

exclaim: "Weapons are baleful instruments, strife is

antagonistic to virtue, a military commander is the negation of

civil order!" The unpalatable fact remains, however, that even

Imperial wishes must be subordinated to military necessity.]

4. The general who thoroughly understands the advantages

that accompany variation of tactics knows how to handle his

troops.

5. The general who does not understand these, may be well

acquainted with the configuration of the country, yet he will not

be able to turn his knowledge to practical account.

[Literally, "get the advantage of the ground," which means

not only securing good positions, but availing oneself of natural

advantages in every possible way. Chang Yu says: "Every kind of

ground is characterized by certain natural features, and also

gives scope for a certain variability of plan. How it is

possible to turn these natural features to account unless

topographical knowledge is supplemented by versatility of mind?"]

6. So, the student of war who is unversed in the art of war

of varying his plans, even though he be acquainted with the Five

Advantages, will fail to make the best use of his men.

[Chia Lin tells us that these imply five obvious and

generally advantageous lines of action, namely: "if a certain

road is short, it must be followed; if an army is isolated, it

must be attacked; if a town is in a parlous condition, it must be

besieged; if a position can be stormed, it must be attempted; and

if consistent with military operations, the ruler's commands must

be obeyed." But there are circumstances which sometimes forbid a

general to use these advantages. For instance, "a certain road

may be the shortest way for him, but if he knows that it abounds

in natural obstacles, or that the enemy has laid an ambush on it,

he will not follow that road. A hostile force may be open to

attack, but if he knows that it is hard-pressed and likely to

fight with desperation, he will refrain from striking," and so

on.]

7. Hence in the wise leader's plans, considerations of

advantage and of disadvantage will be blended together.

["Whether in an advantageous position or a disadvantageous

one," says Ts`ao Kung, "the opposite state should be always

present to your mind."]

8. If our expectation of advantage be tempered in this way,

we may succeed in accomplishing the essential part of our

schemes.

[Tu Mu says: "If we wish to wrest an advantage from the

enemy, we must not fix our minds on that alone, but allow for the

possibility of the enemy also doing some harm to us, and let this

enter as a factor into our calculations."]

9. If, on the other hand, in the midst of difficulties we

are always ready to seize an advantage, we may extricate

ourselves from misfortune.

[Tu Mu says: "If I wish to extricate myself from a

dangerous position, I must consider not only the enemy's ability

to injure me, but also my own ability to gain an advantage over

the enemy. If in my counsels these two considerations are

properly blended, I shall succeed in liberating myself.... For

instance; if I am surrounded by the enemy and only think of

effecting an escape, the nervelessness of my policy will incite

my adversary to pursue and crush me; it would be far better to

encourage my men to deliver a bold counter-attack, and use the

advantage thus gained to free myself from the enemy's toils."

See the story of Ts`ao Ts`ao, VII. ss. 35, note.]

10. Reduce the hostile chiefs by inflicting damage on them;

[Chia Lin enumerates several ways of inflicting this injury,

some of which would only occur to the Oriental mind:--"Entice

away the enemy's best and wisest men, so that he may be left

without counselors. Introduce traitors into his country, that

the government policy may be rendered futile. Foment intrigue

and deceit, and thus sow dissension between the ruler and his

ministers. By means of every artful contrivance, cause

deterioration amongst his men and waste of his treasure. Corrupt

his morals by insidious gifts leading him into excess. Disturb

and unsettle his mind by presenting him with lovely women."

Chang Yu (after Wang Hsi) makes a different interpretation of Sun

Tzu here: "Get the enemy into a position where he must suffer

injury, and he will submit of his own accord."]

and make trouble for them,

[Tu Mu, in this phrase, in his interpretation indicates that

trouble should be make for the enemy affecting their

"possessions," or, as we might say, "assets," which he considers

to be "a large army, a rich exchequer, harmony amongst the

soldiers, punctual fulfillment of commands." These give us a

whip-hand over the enemy.]

and keep them constantly engaged;

[Literally, "make servants of them." Tu Yu says "prevent

the from having any rest."]

hold out specious allurements, and make them rush to any given

point.

[Meng Shih's note contains an excellent example of the

idiomatic use of: "cause them to forget PIEN (the reasons for

acting otherwise than on their first impulse), and hasten in our

direction."]

11. The art of war teaches us to rely not on the likelihood

of the enemy's not coming, but on our own readiness to receive

him; not on the chance of his not attacking, but rather on the

fact that we have made our position unassailable.

12. There are five dangerous faults which may affect a

general:

(1) Recklessness, which leads to destruction;

["Bravery without forethought," as Ts`ao Kung analyzes it,

which causes a man to fight blindly and desperately like a mad

bull. Such an opponent, says Chang Yu, "must not be encountered

with brute force, but may be lured into an ambush and slain."

Cf. Wu Tzu, chap. IV. ad init.: "In estimating the character of

a general, men are wont to pay exclusive attention to his

courage, forgetting that courage is only one out of many

qualities which a general should possess. The merely brave man

is prone to fight recklessly; and he who fights recklessly,

without any perception of what is expedient, must be condemned."

Ssu-ma Fa, too, make the incisive remark: "Simply going to one's

death does not bring about victory."]

(2) cowardice, which leads to capture;

[Ts`ao Kung defines the Chinese word translated here as

"cowardice" as being of the man "whom timidity prevents from

advancing to seize an advantage," and Wang Hsi adds "who is quick

to flee at the sight of danger." Meng Shih gives the closer

paraphrase "he who is bent on returning alive," this is, the man

who will never take a risk. But, as Sun Tzu knew, nothing is to

be achieved in war unless you are willing to take risks. T`ai

Kung said: "He who lets an advantage slip will subsequently

bring upon himself real disaster." In 404 A.D., Liu Yu pursued

the rebel Huan Hsuan up the Yangtsze and fought a naval battle

with him at the island of Ch`eng-hung. The loyal troops numbered

only a few thousands, while their opponents were in great force.

But Huan Hsuan, fearing the fate which was in store for him

should be be overcome, had a light boat made fast to the side of

his war-junk, so that he might escape, if necessary, at a

moment's notice. The natural result was that the fighting spirit

of his soldiers was utterly quenched, and when the loyalists made

an attack from windward with fireships, all striving with the

utmost ardor to be first in the fray, Huan Hsuan's forces were

routed, had to burn all their baggage and fled for two days and

nights without stopping. Chang Yu tells a somewhat similar story

of Chao Ying-ch`i, a general of the Chin State who during a

battle with the army of Ch`u in 597 B.C. had a boat kept in

readiness for him on the river, wishing in case of defeat to be

the first to get across.]

(3) a hasty temper, which can be provoked by insults;

[Tu Mu tells us that Yao Hsing, when opposed in 357 A.D. by

Huang Mei, Teng Ch`iang and others shut himself up behind his

walls and refused to fight. Teng Ch`iang said: "Our adversary

is of a choleric temper and easily provoked; let us make constant

sallies and break down his walls, then he will grow angry and

come out. Once we can bring his force to battle, it is doomed to

be our prey." This plan was acted upon, Yao Hsiang came out to

fight, was lured as far as San-yuan by the enemy's pretended

flight, and finally attacked and slain.]

(4) a delicacy of honor which is sensitive to shame;

[This need not be taken to mean that a sense of honor is

really a defect in a general. What Sun Tzu condemns is rather an

exaggerated sensitiveness to slanderous reports, the thin-skinned

man who is stung by opprobrium, however undeserved. Mei Yao-

ch`en truly observes, though somewhat paradoxically: "The seek

after glory should be careless of public opinion."]

(5) over-solicitude for his men, which exposes him to worry

and trouble.

[Here again, Sun Tzu does not mean that the general is to be

careless of the welfare of his troops. All he wishes to

emphasize is the danger of sacrificing any important military

advantage to the immediate comfort of his men. This is a

shortsighted policy, because in the long run the troops will

suffer more from the defeat, or, at best, the prolongation of the

war, which will be the consequence. A mistaken feeling of pity

will often induce a general to relieve a beleaguered city, or to

reinforce a hard-pressed detachment, contrary to his military

instincts. It is now generally admitted that our repeated

efforts to relieve Ladysmith in the South African War were so

many strategical blunders which defeated their own purpose. And

in the end, relief came through the very man who started out with

the distinct resolve no longer to subordinate the interests of

the whole to sentiment in favor of a part. An old soldier of one

of our generals who failed most conspicuously in this war, tried

once, I remember, to defend him to me on the ground that he was

always "so good to his men." By this plea, had he but known it,

he was only condemning him out of Sun Tzu's mouth.]

13. These are the five besetting sins of a general, ruinous

to the conduct of war.

14. When an army is overthrown and its leader slain, the

cause will surely be found among these five dangerous faults.

Let them be a subject of meditation.

[1] "Marshal Turenne," p. 50.