XI. THE NINE SITUATIONS

XI. THE NINE SITUATIONS

1. Sun Tzu said: The art of war recognizes nine varieties

of ground:

(1) Dispersive ground;

(2) facile ground;

(3)contentious ground;

(4) open ground;

(5) ground of intersecting highways;

(6) serious ground;

(7) difficult ground;

(8) hemmed-in ground;

(9) desperate ground.

2. When a chieftain is fighting in his own territory, it is

dispersive ground.

[So called because the soldiers, being near to their homes

and anxious to see their wives and children, are likely to seize

the opportunity afforded by a battle and scatter in every

direction. "In their advance," observes Tu Mu, "they will lack

the valor of desperation, and when they retreat, they will find

harbors of refuge."]

3. When he has penetrated into hostile territory, but to no

great distance, it is facile ground.

[Li Ch`uan and Ho Shih say "because of the facility for

retreating," and the other commentators give similar

explanations. Tu Mu remarks: "When your army has crossed the

border, you should burn your boats and bridges, in order to make

it clear to everybody that you have no hankering after home."]

4. Ground the possession of which imports great advantage

to either side, is contentious ground.

[Tu Mu defines the ground as ground "to be contended for."

Ts`ao Kung says: "ground on which the few and the weak can

defeat the many and the strong," such as "the neck of a pass,"

instanced by Li Ch`uan. Thus, Thermopylae was of this

classification because the possession of it, even for a few days

only, meant holding the entire invading army in check and thus

gaining invaluable time. Cf. Wu Tzu, ch. V. ad init.: "For

those who have to fight in the ratio of one to ten, there is

nothing better than a narrow pass." When Lu Kuang was returning

from his triumphant expedition to Turkestan in 385 A.D., and had

got as far as I-ho, laden with spoils, Liang Hsi, administrator

of Liang-chou, taking advantage of the death of Fu Chien, King of

Ch`in, plotted against him and was for barring his way into the

province. Yang Han, governor of Kao-ch`ang, counseled him,

saying: "Lu Kuang is fresh from his victories in the west, and

his soldiers are vigorous and mettlesome. If we oppose him in

the shifting sands of the desert, we shall be no match for him,

and we must therefore try a different plan. Let us hasten to

occupy the defile at the mouth of the Kao-wu pass, thus cutting

him off from supplies of water, and when his troops are

prostrated with thirst, we can dictate our own terms without

moving. Or if you think that the pass I mention is too far off,

we could make a stand against him at the I-wu pass, which is

nearer. The cunning and resource of Tzu-fang himself would be

expended in vain against the enormous strength of these two

positions." Liang Hsi, refusing to act on this advice, was

overwhelmed and swept away by the invader.]

5. Ground on which each side has liberty of movement is

open ground.

[There are various interpretations of the Chinese adjective

for this type of ground. Ts`ao Kung says it means "ground

covered with a network of roads," like a chessboard. Ho Shih

suggested: "ground on which intercommunication is easy."]

6. Ground which forms the key to three contiguous states,

[Ts`au Kung defines this as: "Our country adjoining the

enemy's and a third country conterminous with both." Meng Shih

instances the small principality of Cheng, which was bounded on

the north-east by Ch`i, on the west by Chin, and on the south by

Ch`u.]

so that he who occupies it first has most of the Empire at his

command,

[The belligerent who holds this dominating position can

constrain most of them to become his allies.]

is a ground of intersecting highways.

7. When an army has penetrated into the heart of a hostile

country, leaving a number of fortified cities in its rear, it is

serious ground.

[Wang Hsi explains the name by saying that "when an army has

reached such a point, its situation is serious."]

8. Mountain forests,

[Or simply "forests."]

rugged steeps, marshes and fens--all country that is hard to

traverse: this is difficult ground.

9. Ground which is reached through narrow gorges, and from

which we can only retire by tortuous paths, so that a small

number of the enemy would suffice to crush a large body of our

men: this is hemmed in ground.

10. Ground on which we can only be saved from destruction

by fighting without delay, is desperate ground.

[The situation, as pictured by Ts`ao Kung, is very similar

to the "hemmed-in ground" except that here escape is no longer

possible: "A lofty mountain in front, a large river behind,

advance impossible, retreat blocked." Ch`en Hao says: "to be on

'desperate ground' is like sitting in a leaking boat or crouching

in a burning house." Tu Mu quotes from Li Ching a vivid

description of the plight of an army thus entrapped: "Suppose an

army invading hostile territory without the aid of local guides:

-- it falls into a fatal snare and is at the enemy's mercy. A

ravine on the left, a mountain on the right, a pathway so

perilous that the horses have to be roped together and the

chariots carried in slings, no passage open in front, retreat cut

off behind, no choice but to proceed in single file. Then,

before there is time to range our soldiers in order of battle,

the enemy is overwhelming strength suddenly appears on the scene.

Advancing, we can nowhere take a breathing-space; retreating, we

have no haven of refuge. We seek a pitched battle, but in vain;

yet standing on the defensive, none of us has a moment's respite.

If we simply maintain our ground, whole days and months will

crawl by; the moment we make a move, we have to sustain the

enemy's attacks on front and rear. The country is wild,

destitute of water and plants; the army is lacking in the

necessaries of life, the horses are jaded and the men worn-out,

all the resources of strength and skill unavailing, the pass so

narrow that a single man defending it can check the onset of ten

thousand; all means of offense in the hands of the enemy, all

points of vantage already forfeited by ourselves:--in this

terrible plight, even though we had the most valiant soldiers and

the keenest of weapons, how could they be employed with the

slightest effect?" Students of Greek history may be reminded of

the awful close to the Sicilian expedition, and the agony of the

Athenians under Nicias and Demonsthenes. [See Thucydides, VII.

78 sqq.].]

11. On dispersive ground, therefore, fight not. On facile

ground, halt not. On contentious ground, attack not.

[But rather let all your energies be bent on occupying the

advantageous position first. So Ts`ao Kung. Li Ch`uan and

others, however, suppose the meaning to be that the enemy has

already forestalled us, sot that it would be sheer madness to

attack. In the SUN TZU HSU LU, when the King of Wu inquires what

should be done in this case, Sun Tzu replies: "The rule with

regard to contentious ground is that those in possession have the

advantage over the other side. If a position of this kind is

secured first by the enemy, beware of attacking him. Lure him

away by pretending to flee--show your banners and sound your

drums--make a dash for other places that he cannot afford to

lose--trail brushwood and raise a dust--confound his ears and

eyes--detach a body of your best troops, and place it secretly in

ambuscade. Then your opponent will sally forth to the rescue."]

12. On open ground, do not try to block the enemy's way.

[Because the attempt would be futile, and would expose the

blocking force itself to serious risks. There are two

interpretations available here. I follow that of Chang Yu. The

other is indicated in Ts`ao Kung's brief note: "Draw closer

together"--i.e., see that a portion of your own army is not cut

off.]

On the ground of intersecting highways, join hands with your

allies.

[Or perhaps, "form alliances with neighboring states."]

13. On serious ground, gather in plunder.

[On this, Li Ch`uan has the following delicious note: "When

an army penetrates far into the enemy's country, care must be

taken not to alienate the people by unjust treatment. Follow the

example of the Han Emperor Kao Tsu, whose march into Ch`in

territory was marked by no violation of women or looting of

valuables. [Nota bene: this was in 207 B.C., and may well cause

us to blush for the Christian armies that entered Peking in 1900

A.D.] Thus he won the hearts of all. In the present passage,

then, I think that the true reading must be, not 'plunder,' but

'do not plunder.'" Alas, I fear that in this instance the worthy

commentator's feelings outran his judgment. Tu Mu, at least, has

no such illusions. He says: "When encamped on 'serious ground,'

there being no inducement as yet to advance further, and no

possibility of retreat, one ought to take measures for a

protracted resistance by bringing in provisions from all sides,

and keep a close watch on the enemy."]

In difficult ground, keep steadily on the march.

[Or, in the words of VIII. ss. 2, "do not encamp.]

14. On hemmed-in ground, resort to stratagem.

[Ts`au Kung says: "Try the effect of some unusual

artifice;" and Tu Yu amplifies this by saying: "In such a

position, some scheme must be devised which will suit the

circumstances, and if we can succeed in deluding the enemy, the

peril may be escaped." This is exactly what happened on the

famous occasion when Hannibal was hemmed in among the

mountains on the road to Casilinum, and to all appearances

entrapped by the dictator Fabius. The stratagem which Hannibal

devised to baffle his foes was remarkably like that which T`ien Tan

had also employed with success exactly 62 years before. [See IX.

ss. 24, note.] When night came on, bundles of twigs were fastened

to the horns of some 2000 oxen and set on fire, the terrified animals

being then quickly driven along the mountain side towards the

passes which were beset by the enemy. The strange spectacle of

these rapidly moving lights so alarmed and discomfited the Romans

that they withdrew from their position, and Hannibal's army

passed safely through the defile. [See Polybius, III. 93, 94;

Livy, XXII. 16 17.]

On desperate ground, fight.

[For, as Chia Lin remarks: "if you fight with all your

might, there is a chance of life; where as death is certain if

you cling to your corner."]

15. Those who were called skillful leaders of old knew how

to drive a wedge between the enemy's front and rear;

[More literally, "cause the front and rear to lose touch

with each other."]

to prevent co-operation between his large and small divisions; to

hinder the good troops from rescuing the bad, the officers from

rallying their men.

16. When the enemy's men were united, they managed to keep

them in disorder.

17. When it was to their advantage, they made a forward

move; when otherwise, they stopped still.

[Mei Yao-ch`en connects this with the foregoing: "Having

succeeded in thus dislocating the enemy, they would push forward

in order to secure any advantage to be gained; if there was no

advantage to be gained, they would remain where they were."]

18. If asked how to cope with a great host of the enemy in

orderly array and on the point of marching to the attack, I

should say: "Begin by seizing something which your opponent

holds dear; then he will be amenable to your will."

[Opinions differ as to what Sun Tzu had in mind. Ts`ao Kung

thinks it is "some strategical advantage on which the enemy is

depending." Tu Mu says: "The three things which an enemy is

anxious to do, and on the accomplishment of which his success

depends, are: (1) to capture our favorable positions; (2) to

ravage our cultivated land; (3) to guard his own communications."

Our object then must be to thwart his plans in these three

directions and thus render him helpless. [Cf. III. ss. 3.] By

boldly seizing the initiative in this way, you at once throw the

other side on the defensive.]

19. Rapidity is the essence of war:

[According to Tu Mu, "this is a summary of leading

principles in warfare," and he adds: "These are the profoundest

truths of military science, and the chief business of the

general." The following anecdotes, told by Ho Shih, shows the

importance attached to speed by two of China's greatest generals.

In 227 A.D., Meng Ta, governor of Hsin-ch`eng under the Wei

Emperor Wen Ti, was meditating defection to the House of Shu, and

had entered into correspondence with Chu-ko Liang, Prime Minister

of that State. The Wei general Ssu-ma I was then military

governor of Wan, and getting wind of Meng Ta's treachery, he at

once set off with an army to anticipate his revolt, having

previously cajoled him by a specious message of friendly import.

Ssu-ma's officers came to him and said: "If Meng Ta has leagued

himself with Wu and Shu, the matter should be thoroughly

investigated before we make a move." Ssu-ma I replied: "Meng Ta

is an unprincipled man, and we ought to go and punish him at

once, while he is still wavering and before he has thrown off the

mask." Then, by a series of forced marches, be brought his army

under the walls of Hsin-ch`eng with in a space of eight days.

Now Meng Ta had previously said in a letter to Chu-ko Liang:

"Wan is 1200 LI from here. When the news of my revolt reaches

Ssu-ma I, he will at once inform his imperial master, but it will

be a whole month before any steps can be taken, and by that time

my city will be well fortified. Besides, Ssu-ma I is sure not to

come himself, and the generals that will be sent against us are

not worth troubling about." The next letter, however, was filled

with consternation: "Though only eight days have passed since I

threw off my allegiance, an army is already at the city-gates.

What miraculous rapidity is this!" A fortnight later, Hsin-

ch`eng had fallen and Meng Ta had lost his head. [See

CHIN SHU, ch. 1, f. 3.] In 621 A.D., Li Ching was sent from

K`uei-chou in Ssu-ch`uan to reduce the successful rebel Hsiao

Hsien, who had set up as Emperor at the modern Ching-chou Fu in

Hupeh. It was autumn, and the Yangtsze being then in flood,

Hsiao Hsien never dreamt that his adversary would venture to come

down through the gorges, and consequently made no preparations.

But Li Ching embarked his army without loss of time, and was just

about to start when the other generals implored him to postpone

his departure until the river was in a less dangerous state for

navigation. Li Ching replied: "To the soldier, overwhelming

speed is of paramount importance, and he must never miss

opportunities. Now is the time to strike, before Hsiao Hsien

even knows that we have got an army together. If we seize the

present moment when the river is in flood, we shall appear before

his capital with startling suddenness, like the thunder which is

heard before you have time to stop your ears against it. [See

VII. ss. 19, note.] This is the great principle in war. Even if

he gets to know of our approach, he will have to levy his

soldiers in such a hurry that they will not be fit to oppose us.

Thus the full fruits of victory will be ours." All came about as

he predicted, and Hsiao Hsien was obliged to surrender, nobly

stipulating that his people should be spared and he alone suffer

the penalty of death.]

take advantage of the enemy's unreadiness, make your way by

unexpected routes, and attack unguarded spots.

20. The following are the principles to be observed by an

invading force: The further you penetrate into a country, the

greater will be the solidarity of your troops, and thus the

defenders will not prevail against you.

21. Make forays in fertile country in order to supply your

army with food.

[Cf. supra, ss. 13. Li Ch`uan does not venture on a note

here.]

22. Carefully study the well-being of your men,

[For "well-being", Wang Hsi means, "Pet them, humor them,

give them plenty of food and drink, and look after them

generally."]

and do not overtax them. Concentrate your energy and hoard your

strength.

[Ch`en recalls the line of action adopted in 224 B.C. by the

famous general Wang Chien, whose military genius largely

contributed to the success of the First Emperor. He had invaded

the Ch`u State, where a universal levy was made to oppose him.

But, being doubtful of the temper of his troops, he declined all

invitations to fight and remained strictly on the defensive. In

vain did the Ch`u general try to force a battle: day after day

Wang Chien kept inside his walls and would not come out, but

devoted his whole time and energy to winning the affection and

confidence of his men. He took care that they should be well

fed, sharing his own meals with them, provided facilities for

bathing, and employed every method of judicious indulgence to

weld them into a loyal and homogenous body. After some time had

elapsed, he told off certain persons to find out how the men were

amusing themselves. The answer was, that they were contending

with one another in putting the weight and long-jumping. When

Wang Chien heard that they were engaged in these athletic

pursuits, he knew that their spirits had been strung up to the

required pitch and that they were now ready for fighting. By

this time the Ch`u army, after repeating their challenge again

and again, had marched away eastwards in disgust. The Ch`in

general immediately broke up his camp and followed them, and in

the battle that ensued they were routed with great slaughter.

Shortly afterwards, the whole of Ch`u was conquered by Ch`in, and

the king Fu-ch`u led into captivity.]

Keep your army continually on the move,

[In order that the enemy may never know exactly where you

are. It has struck me, however, that the true reading might be

"link your army together."]

and devise unfathomable plans.

23. Throw your soldiers into positions whence there is no

escape, and they will prefer death to flight. If they will face

death, there is nothing they may not achieve.

[Chang Yu quotes his favorite Wei Liao Tzu (ch. 3): "If one

man were to run amok with a sword in the market-place, and

everybody else tried to get our of his way, I should not allow

that this man alone had courage and that all the rest were

contemptible cowards. The truth is, that a desperado and a man

who sets some value on his life do not meet on even terms."]

Officers and men alike will put forth their uttermost strength.

[Chang Yu says: "If they are in an awkward place together,

they will surely exert their united strength to get out of it."]

24. Soldiers when in desperate straits lose the sense of

fear. If there is no place of refuge, they will stand firm. If

they are in hostile country, they will show a stubborn front. If

there is no help for it, they will fight hard.

25. Thus, without waiting to be marshaled, the soldiers

will be constantly on the qui vive; without waiting to be asked,

they will do your will;

[Literally, "without asking, you will get."]

without restrictions, they will be faithful; without giving

orders, they can be trusted.

26. Prohibit the taking of omens, and do away with

superstitious doubts. Then, until death itself comes, no

calamity need be feared.

[The superstitious, "bound in to saucy doubts and fears,"

degenerate into cowards and "die many times before their deaths."

Tu Mu quotes Huang Shih-kung: "'Spells and incantations should

be strictly forbidden, and no officer allowed to inquire by

divination into the fortunes of an army, for fear the soldiers'

minds should be seriously perturbed.' The meaning is," he

continues, "that if all doubts and scruples are discarded, your

men will never falter in their resolution until they die."]

27. If our soldiers are not overburdened with money, it is

not because they have a distaste for riches; if their lives are

not unduly long, it is not because they are disinclined to

longevity.

[Chang Yu has the best note on this passage: "Wealth and

long life are things for which all men have a natural

inclination. Hence, if they burn or fling away valuables, and

sacrifice their own lives, it is not that they dislike them, but

simply that they have no choice." Sun Tzu is slyly insinuating

that, as soldiers are but human, it is for the general to see

that temptations to shirk fighting and grow rich are not thrown

in their way.]

28. On the day they are ordered out to battle, your

soldiers may weep,

[The word in the Chinese is "snivel." This is taken to

indicate more genuine grief than tears alone.]

those sitting up bedewing their garments, and those lying down

letting the tears run down their cheeks.

[Not because they are afraid, but because, as Ts`ao Kung

says, "all have embraced the firm resolution to do or die." We

may remember that the heroes of the Iliad were equally childlike

in showing their emotion. Chang Yu alludes to the mournful

parting at the I River between Ching K`o and his friends, when

the former was sent to attempt the life of the King of Ch`in

(afterwards First Emperor) in 227 B.C. The tears of all flowed

down like rain as he bade them farewell and uttered the following

lines: "The shrill blast is blowing, Chilly the burn; Your

champion is going--Not to return." [1] ]

But let them once be brought to bay, and they will display the

courage of a Chu or a Kuei.

[Chu was the personal name of Chuan Chu, a native of the Wu

State and contemporary with Sun Tzu himself, who was employed by

Kung-tzu Kuang, better known as Ho Lu Wang, to assassinate his

sovereign Wang Liao with a dagger which he secreted in the belly

of a fish served up at a banquet. He succeeded in his attempt,

but was immediately hacked to pieced by the king's bodyguard.

This was in 515 B.C. The other hero referred to, Ts`ao Kuei (or

Ts`ao Mo), performed the exploit which has made his name famous

166 years earlier, in 681 B.C. Lu had been thrice defeated by

Ch`i, and was just about to conclude a treaty surrendering a

large slice of territory, when Ts`ao Kuei suddenly seized Huan

Kung, the Duke of Ch`i, as he stood on the altar steps and held a

dagger against his chest. None of the duke's retainers dared to

move a muscle, and Ts`ao Kuei proceeded to demand full

restitution, declaring the Lu was being unjustly treated because

she was a smaller and a weaker state. Huan Kung, in peril of his

life, was obliged to consent, whereupon Ts`ao Kuei flung away his

dagger and quietly resumed his place amid the terrified

assemblage without having so much as changed color. As was to be

expected, the Duke wanted afterwards to repudiate the bargain,

but his wise old counselor Kuan Chung pointed out to him the

impolicy of breaking his word, and the upshot was that this bold

stroke regained for Lu the whole of what she had lost in three

pitched battles.]

29. The skillful tactician may be likened to the SHUAI-JAN.

Now the SHUAI-JAN is a snake that is found in the Ch`ang

mountains.

["Shuai-jan" means "suddenly" or "rapidly," and the snake in

question was doubtless so called owing to the rapidity of its

movements. Through this passage, the term in the Chinese has now

come to be used in the sense of "military maneuvers."]

Strike at its head, and you will be attacked by its tail; strike

at its tail, and you will be attacked by its head; strike at its

middle, and you will be attacked by head and tail both.

30. Asked if an army can be made to imitate the SHUAI-JAN,

[That is, as Mei Yao-ch`en says, "Is it possible to make the

front and rear of an army each swiftly responsive to attack on

the other, just as though they were part of a single living

body?"]

I should answer, Yes. For the men of Wu and the men of Yueh are

enemies;

[Cf. VI. ss. 21.]

yet if they are crossing a river in the same boat and are caught

by a storm, they will come to each other's assistance just as the

left hand helps the right.

[The meaning is: If two enemies will help each other in a

time of common peril, how much more should two parts of the same

army, bound together as they are by every tie of interest and

fellow-feeling. Yet it is notorious that many a campaign has

been ruined through lack of cooperation, especially in the case

of allied armies.]

31. Hence it is not enough to put one's trust in the

tethering of horses, and the burying of chariot wheels in the

ground

[These quaint devices to prevent one's army from running

away recall the Athenian hero Sophanes, who carried the anchor

with him at the battle of Plataea, by means of which he fastened

himself firmly to one spot. [See Herodotus, IX. 74.] It is not

enough, says Sun Tzu, to render flight impossible by such

mechanical means. You will not succeed unless your men have

tenacity and unity of purpose, and, above all, a spirit of

sympathetic cooperation. This is the lesson which can be learned

from the SHUAI-JAN.]

32. The principle on which to manage an army is to set up

one standard of courage which all must reach.

[Literally, "level the courage [of all] as though [it were

that of] one." If the ideal army is to form a single organic

whole, then it follows that the resolution and spirit of its

component parts must be of the same quality, or at any rate must

not fall below a certain standard. Wellington's seemingly

ungrateful description of his army at Waterloo as "the worst he

had ever commanded" meant no more than that it was deficient in

this important particular--unity of spirit and courage. Had he

not foreseen the Belgian defections and carefully kept those

troops in the background, he would almost certainly have lost the

day.]

33. How to make the best of both strong and weak--that is a

question involving the proper use of ground.

[Mei Yao-ch`en's paraphrase is: "The way to eliminate the

differences of strong and weak and to make both serviceable is to

utilize accidental features of the ground." Less reliable

troops, if posted in strong positions, will hold out as long as

better troops on more exposed terrain. The advantage of position

neutralizes the inferiority in stamina and courage. Col.

Henderson says: "With all respect to the text books, and to the

ordinary tactical teaching, I am inclined to think that the study

of ground is often overlooked, and that by no means sufficient

importance is attached to the selection of positions... and to

the immense advantages that are to be derived, whether you are

defending or attacking, from the proper utilization of natural

features." [2] ]

34. Thus the skillful general conducts his army just as

though he were leading a single man, willy-nilly, by the hand.

[Tu Mu says: "The simile has reference to the ease with

which he does it."]

35. It is the business of a general to be quiet and thus

ensure secrecy; upright and just, and thus maintain order.

36. He must be able to mystify his officers and men by

false reports and appearances,

[Literally, "to deceive their eyes and ears."]

and thus keep them in total ignorance.

[Ts`ao Kung gives us one of his excellent apophthegms: "The

troops must not be allowed to share your schemes in the

beginning; they may only rejoice with you over their happy

outcome." "To mystify, mislead, and surprise the enemy," is one

of the first principles in war, as had been frequently pointed

out. But how about the other process--the mystification of one's

own men? Those who may think that Sun Tzu is over-emphatic on

this point would do well to read Col. Henderson's remarks on

Stonewall Jackson's Valley campaign: "The infinite pains," he

says, "with which Jackson sought to conceal, even from his most

trusted staff officers, his movements, his intentions, and his

thoughts, a commander less thorough would have pronounced

useless"--etc. etc. [3] In the year 88 A.D., as we read in ch.

47 of the HOU HAN SHU, "Pan Ch`ao took the field with 25,000 men

from Khotan and other Central Asian states with the object of

crushing Yarkand. The King of Kutcha replied by dispatching his

chief commander to succor the place with an army drawn from the

kingdoms of Wen-su, Ku-mo, and Wei-t`ou, totaling 50,000 men.

Pan Ch`ao summoned his officers and also the King of Khotan to a

council of war, and said: 'Our forces are now outnumbered and

unable to make head against the enemy. The best plan, then, is

for us to separate and disperse, each in a different direction.

The King of Khotan will march away by the easterly route, and I

will then return myself towards the west. Let us wait until the

evening drum has sounded and then start.' Pan Ch`ao now secretly

released the prisoners whom he had taken alive, and the King of

Kutcha was thus informed of his plans. Much elated by the news,

the latter set off at once at the head of 10,000 horsemen to bar

Pan Ch`ao's retreat in the west, while the King of Wen-su rode

eastward with 8000 horse in order to intercept the King of

Khotan. As soon as Pan Ch`ao knew that the two chieftains had

gone, he called his divisions together, got them well in hand,

and at cock-crow hurled them against the army of Yarkand, as it

lay encamped. The barbarians, panic-stricken, fled in confusion,

and were closely pursued by Pan Ch`ao. Over 5000 heads were

brought back as trophies, besides immense spoils in the shape of

horses and cattle and valuables of every description. Yarkand

then capitulating, Kutcha and the other kingdoms drew off their

respective forces. From that time forward, Pan Ch`ao's prestige

completely overawed the countries of the west." In this case, we

see that the Chinese general not only kept his own officers in

ignorance of his real plans, but actually took the bold step of

dividing his army in order to deceive the enemy.]

37. By altering his arrangements and changing his plans,

[Wang Hsi thinks that this means not using the same

stratagem twice.]

he keeps the enemy without definite knowledge.

[Chang Yu, in a quotation from another work, says: "The

axiom, that war is based on deception, does not apply only to

deception of the enemy. You must deceive even your own soldiers.

Make them follow you, but without letting them know why."]

By shifting his camp and taking circuitous routes, he prevents

the enemy from anticipating his purpose.

38. At the critical moment, the leader of an army acts like

one who has climbed up a height and then kicks away the ladder

behind him. He carries his men deep into hostile territory

before he shows his hand.

[Literally, "releases the spring" (see V. ss. 15), that is,

takes some decisive step which makes it impossible for the army

to return--like Hsiang Yu, who sunk his ships after crossing a

river. Ch`en Hao, followed by Chia Lin, understands the words

less well as "puts forth every artifice at his command."]

39. He burns his boats and breaks his cooking-pots; like a

shepherd driving a flock of sheep, he drives his men this way and

that, and nothing knows whither he is going.

[Tu Mu says: "The army is only cognizant of orders to

advance or retreat; it is ignorant of the ulterior ends of

attacking and conquering."]

40. To muster his host and bring it into danger:--this may

be termed the business of the general.

[Sun Tzu means that after mobilization there should be no

delay in aiming a blow at the enemy's heart. Note how he returns

again and again to this point. Among the warring states of

ancient China, desertion was no doubt a much more present fear

and serious evil than it is in the armies of today.]

41. The different measures suited to the nine varieties of

ground;

[Chang Yu says: "One must not be hide-bound in interpreting

the rules for the nine varieties of ground.]

the expediency of aggressive or defensive tactics; and the

fundamental laws of human nature: these are things that must

most certainly be studied.

42. When invading hostile territory, the general principle

is, that penetrating deeply brings cohesion; penetrating but a

short way means dispersion.

[Cf. supra, ss. 20.]

43. When you leave your own country behind, and take your

army across neighborhood territory, you find yourself on critical

ground.

[This "ground" is curiously mentioned in VIII. ss. 2, but it

does not figure among the Nine Situations or the Six Calamities

in chap. X. One's first impulse would be to translate it distant

ground," but this, if we can trust the commentators, is precisely

what is not meant here. Mei Yao-ch`en says it is "a position not

far enough advanced to be called 'facile,' and not near enough to

home to be 'dispersive,' but something between the two." Wang Hsi

says: "It is ground separated from home by an interjacent state,

whose territory we have had to cross in order to reach it.

Hence, it is incumbent on us to settle our business there

quickly." He adds that this position is of rare occurrence,

which is the reason why it is not included among the Nine

Situations.]

When there are means of communication on all four sides, the

ground is one of intersecting highways.

44. When you penetrate deeply into a country, it is serious

ground. When you penetrate but a little way, it is facile

ground.

45. When you have the enemy's strongholds on your rear, and

narrow passes in front, it is hemmed-in ground. When there is no

place of refuge at all, it is desperate ground.

46. Therefore, on dispersive ground, I would inspire my men

with unity of purpose.

[This end, according to Tu Mu, is best attained by remaining

on the defensive, and avoiding battle. Cf. supra, ss. 11.]

On facile ground, I would see that there is close connection

between all parts of my army.

[As Tu Mu says, the object is to guard against two possible

contingencies: "(1) the desertion of our own troops; (2) a

sudden attack on the part of the enemy." Cf. VII. ss. 17. Mei

Yao-ch`en says: "On the march, the regiments should be in close

touch; in an encampment, there should be continuity between the

fortifications."]

47. On contentious ground, I would hurry up my rear.

[This is Ts`ao Kung's interpretation. Chang Yu adopts it,

saying: "We must quickly bring up our rear, so that head and

tail may both reach the goal." That is, they must not be allowed

to straggle up a long way apart. Mei Yao-ch`en offers another

equally plausible explanation: "Supposing the enemy has not yet

reached the coveted position, and we are behind him, we should

advance with all speed in order to dispute its possession."

Ch`en Hao, on the other hand, assuming that the enemy has had

time to select his own ground, quotes VI. ss. 1, where Sun Tzu

warns us against coming exhausted to the attack. His own idea of

the situation is rather vaguely expressed: "If there is a

favorable position lying in front of you, detach a picked body of

troops to occupy it, then if the enemy, relying on their numbers,

come up to make a fight for it, you may fall quickly on their

rear with your main body, and victory will be assured." It was

thus, he adds, that Chao She beat the army of Ch`in. (See p.

57.)]

48. On open ground, I would keep a vigilant eye on my

defenses. On ground of intersecting highways, I would

consolidate my alliances.

49. On serious ground, I would try to ensure a continuous

stream of supplies.

[The commentators take this as referring to forage and

plunder, not, as one might expect, to an unbroken communication

with a home base.]

On difficult ground, I would keep pushing on along the road.

50. On hemmed-in ground, I would block any way of retreat.

[Meng Shih says: "To make it seem that I meant to defend

the position, whereas my real intention is to burst suddenly

through the enemy's lines." Mei Yao-ch`en says: "in order to

make my soldiers fight with desperation." Wang Hsi says,

"fearing lest my men be tempted to run away." Tu Mu points out

that this is the converse of VII. ss. 36, where it is the enemy

who is surrounded. In 532 A.D., Kao Huan, afterwards Emperor and

canonized as Shen-wu, was surrounded by a great army under Erh-

chu Chao and others. His own force was comparatively small,

consisting only of 2000 horse and something under 30,000 foot.

The lines of investment had not been drawn very closely together,

gaps being left at certain points. But Kao Huan, instead of

trying to escape, actually made a shift to block all the

remaining outlets himself by driving into them a number of oxen

and donkeys roped together. As soon as his officers and men saw

that there was nothing for it but to conquer or die, their

spirits rose to an extraordinary pitch of exaltation, and they

charged with such desperate ferocity that the opposing ranks

broke and crumbled under their onslaught.]

On desperate ground, I would proclaim to my soldiers the

hopelessness of saving their lives.

Tu Yu says: "Burn your baggage and impedimenta, throw away

your stores and provisions, choke up the wells, destroy your

cooking-stoves, and make it plain to your men that they cannot

survive, but must fight to the death." Mei Yao-ch`en says: "The

only chance of life lies in giving up all hope of it." This

concludes what Sun Tzu has to say about "grounds" and the

"variations" corresponding to them. Reviewing the passages which

bear on this important subject, we cannot fail to be struck by

the desultory and unmethodical fashion in which it is treated.

Sun Tzu begins abruptly in VIII. ss. 2 to enumerate "variations"

before touching on "grounds" at all, but only mentions five,

namely nos. 7, 5, 8 and 9 of the subsequent list, and one that is

not included in it. A few varieties of ground are dealt with in

the earlier portion of chap. IX, and then chap. X sets forth six

new grounds, with six variations of plan to match. None of these

is mentioned again, though the first is hardly to be

distinguished from ground no. 4 in the next chapter. At last, in

chap. XI, we come to the Nine Grounds par excellence, immediately

followed by the variations. This takes us down to ss. 14. In

SS. 43-45, fresh definitions are provided for nos. 5, 6, 2, 8 and

9 (in the order given), as well as for the tenth ground noticed

in chap. VIII; and finally, the nine variations are enumerated

once more from beginning to end, all, with the exception of 5, 6

and 7, being different from those previously given. Though it is

impossible to account for the present state of Sun Tzu's text, a

few suggestive facts maybe brought into prominence: (1) Chap.

VIII, according to the title, should deal with nine variations,

whereas only five appear. (2) It is an abnormally short chapter.

(3) Chap. XI is entitled The Nine Grounds. Several of these are

defined twice over, besides which there are two distinct lists of

the corresponding variations. (4) The length of the chapter is

disproportionate, being double that of any other except IX. I do

not propose to draw any inferences from these facts, beyond the

general conclusion that Sun Tzu's work cannot have come down to

us in the shape in which it left his hands: chap. VIII is

obviously defective and probably out of place, while XI seems to

contain matter that has either been added by a later hand or

ought to appear elsewhere.]

51. For it is the soldier's disposition to offer an

obstinate resistance when surrounded, to fight hard when he

cannot help himself, and to obey promptly when he has fallen into

danger.

[Chang Yu alludes to the conduct of Pan Ch`ao's devoted

followers in 73 A.D. The story runs thus in the HOU HAN SHU, ch.

47: "When Pan Ch`ao arrived at Shan-shan, Kuang, the King of the

country, received him at first with great politeness and respect;

but shortly afterwards his behavior underwent a sudden change,

and he became remiss and negligent. Pan Ch`ao spoke about this

to the officers of his suite: 'Have you noticed,' he said, 'that

Kuang's polite intentions are on the wane? This must signify

that envoys have come from the Northern barbarians, and that

consequently he is in a state of indecision, not knowing with

which side to throw in his lot. That surely is the reason. The

truly wise man, we are told, can perceive things before they have

come to pass; how much more, then, those that are already

manifest!' Thereupon he called one of the natives who had been

assigned to his service, and set a trap for him, saying: 'Where

are those envoys from the Hsiung-nu who arrived some day ago?'

The man was so taken aback that between surprise and fear he

presently blurted out the whole truth. Pan Ch`ao, keeping his

informant carefully under lock and key, then summoned a general

gathering of his officers, thirty-six in all, and began drinking

with them. When the wine had mounted into their heads a little,

he tried to rouse their spirit still further by addressing them

thus: 'Gentlemen, here we are in the heart of an isolated

region, anxious to achieve riches and honor by some great

exploit. Now it happens that an ambassador from the Hsiung-no

arrived in this kingdom only a few days ago, and the result is

that the respectful courtesy extended towards us by our royal

host has disappeared. Should this envoy prevail upon him to

seize our party and hand us over to the Hsiung-no, our bones will

become food for the wolves of the desert. What are we to do?'

With one accord, the officers replied: 'Standing as we do in

peril of our lives, we will follow our commander through life and

death.' For the sequel of this adventure, see chap. XII. ss. 1,

note.]

52. We cannot enter into alliance with neighboring princes

until we are acquainted with their designs. We are not fit to

lead an army on the march unless we are familiar with the face of

the country--its mountains and forests, its pitfalls and

precipices, its marshes and swamps. We shall be unable to turn

natural advantages to account unless we make use of local guides.

[These three sentences are repeated from VII. SS. 12-14 --

in order to emphasize their importance, the commentators seem to

think. I prefer to regard them as interpolated here in order to

form an antecedent to the following words. With regard to local

guides, Sun Tzu might have added that there is always the risk of

going wrong, either through their treachery or some

misunderstanding such as Livy records (XXII. 13): Hannibal, we

are told, ordered a guide to lead him into the neighborhood of

Casinum, where there was an important pass to be occupied; but

his Carthaginian accent, unsuited to the pronunciation of Latin

names, caused the guide to understand Casilinum instead of

Casinum, and turning from his proper route, he took the army in

that direction, the mistake not being discovered until they had

almost arrived.]

53. To be ignored of any one of the following four or five

principles does not befit a warlike prince.

54. When a warlike prince attacks a powerful state, his

generalship shows itself in preventing the concentration of the

enemy's forces. He overawes his opponents, and their allies are

prevented from joining against him.

[Mei Tao-ch`en constructs one of the chains of reasoning

that are so much affected by the Chinese: "In attacking a

powerful state, if you can divide her forces, you will have a

superiority in strength; if you have a superiority in strength,

you will overawe the enemy; if you overawe the enemy, the

neighboring states will be frightened; and if the neighboring

states are frightened, the enemy's allies will be prevented from

joining her." The following gives a stronger meaning: "If the

great state has once been defeated (before she has had time to

summon her allies), then the lesser states will hold aloof and

refrain from massing their forces." Ch`en Hao and Chang Yu take

the sentence in quite another way. The former says: "Powerful

though a prince may be, if he attacks a large state, he will be

unable to raise enough troops, and must rely to some extent on

external aid; if he dispenses with this, and with overweening

confidence in his own strength, simply tries to intimidate the

enemy, he will surely be defeated." Chang Yu puts his view thus:

"If we recklessly attack a large state, our own people will be

discontented and hang back. But if (as will then be the case)

our display of military force is inferior by half to that of the

enemy, the other chieftains will take fright and refuse to join

us."]

55. Hence he does not strive to ally himself with all and

sundry, nor does he foster the power of other states. He carries

out his own secret designs, keeping his antagonists in awe.

[The train of thought, as said by Li Ch`uan, appears to be

this: Secure against a combination of his enemies, "he can

afford to reject entangling alliances and simply pursue his own

secret designs, his prestige enable him to dispense with external

friendships."]

Thus he is able to capture their cities and overthrow their

kingdoms.

[This paragraph, though written many years before the Ch`in

State became a serious menace, is not a bad summary of the policy

by which the famous Six Chancellors gradually paved the way for

her final triumph under Shih Huang Ti. Chang Yu, following up

his previous note, thinks that Sun Tzu is condemning this

attitude of cold-blooded selfishness and haughty isolation.]

56. Bestow rewards without regard to rule,

[Wu Tzu (ch. 3) less wisely says: "Let advance be richly

rewarded and retreat be heavily punished."]

issue orders

[Literally, "hang" or post up."]

without regard to previous arrangements;

["In order to prevent treachery," says Wang Hsi. The

general meaning is made clear by Ts`ao Kung's quotation from the

SSU-MA FA: "Give instructions only on sighting the enemy; give

rewards when you see deserving deeds." Ts`ao Kung's paraphrase:

"The final instructions you give to your army should not

correspond with those that have been previously posted up."

Chang Yu simplifies this into "your arrangements should not be

divulged beforehand." And Chia Lin says: "there should be no

fixity in your rules and arrangements." Not only is there danger

in letting your plans be known, but war often necessitates the

entire reversal of them at the last moment.]

and you will be able to handle a whole army as though you had to

do with but a single man.

[Cf. supra, ss. 34.]

57. Confront your soldiers with the deed itself; never let

them know your design.

[Literally, "do not tell them words;" i.e. do not give your

reasons for any order. Lord Mansfield once told a junior

colleague to "give no reasons" for his decisions, and the maxim

is even more applicable to a general than to a judge.]

When the outlook is bright, bring it before their eyes; but tell

them nothing when the situation is gloomy.

58. Place your army in deadly peril, and it will survive;

plunge it into desperate straits, and it will come off in safety.

[These words of Sun Tzu were once quoted by Han Hsin in

explanation of the tactics he employed in one of his most

brilliant battles, already alluded to on p. 28. In 204 B.C., he

was sent against the army of Chao, and halted ten miles from the

mouth of the Ching-hsing pass, where the enemy had mustered in

full force. Here, at midnight, he detached a body of 2000 light

cavalry, every man of which was furnished with a red flag. Their

instructions were to make their way through narrow defiles and

keep a secret watch on the enemy. "When the men of Chao see me

in full flight," Han Hsin said, "they will abandon their

fortifications and give chase. This must be the sign for you to

rush in, pluck down the Chao standards and set up the red banners

of Han in their stead." Turning then to his other officers, he

remarked: "Our adversary holds a strong position, and is not

likely to come out and attack us until he sees the standard and

drums of the commander-in-chief, for fear I should turn back and

escape through the mountains." So saying, he first of all sent

out a division consisting of 10,000 men, and ordered them to form

in line of battle with their backs to the River Ti. Seeing this

maneuver, the whole army of Chao broke into loud laughter. By

this time it was broad daylight, and Han Hsin, displaying the

generalissimo's flag, marched out of the pass with drums beating,

and was immediately engaged by the enemy. A great battle

followed, lasting for some time; until at length Han Hsin and his

colleague Chang Ni, leaving drums and banner on the field, fled

to the division on the river bank, where another fierce battle

was raging. The enemy rushed out to pursue them and to secure

the trophies, thus denuding their ramparts of men; but the two

generals succeeded in joining the other army, which was fighting

with the utmost desperation. The time had now come for the 2000

horsemen to play their part. As soon as they saw the men of Chao

following up their advantage, they galloped behind the deserted

walls, tore up the enemy's flags and replaced them by those of

Han. When the Chao army looked back from the pursuit, the sight

of these red flags struck them with terror. Convinced that the

Hans had got in and overpowered their king, they broke up in wild

disorder, every effort of their leader to stay the panic being in

vain. Then the Han army fell on them from both sides and

completed the rout, killing a number and capturing the rest,

amongst whom was King Ya himself.... After the battle, some of

Han Hsin's officers came to him and said: "In the ART OF WAR we

are told to have a hill or tumulus on the right rear, and a river

or marsh on the left front. [This appears to be a blend of Sun

Tzu and T`ai Kung. See IX ss. 9, and note.] You, on the

contrary, ordered us to draw up our troops with the river at our

back. Under these conditions, how did you manage to gain the

victory?" The general replied: "I fear you gentlemen have not

studied the Art of War with sufficient care. Is it not written

there: 'Plunge your army into desperate straits and it will come

off in safety; place it in deadly peril and it will survive'?

Had I taken the usual course, I should never have been able to

bring my colleague round. What says the Military Classic--'Swoop

down on the market-place and drive the men off to fight.' [This

passage does not occur in the present text of Sun Tzu.] If I had

not placed my troops in a position where they were obliged to

fight for their lives, but had allowed each man to follow his own

discretion, there would have been a general debandade, and it

would have been impossible to do anything with them." The

officers admitted the force of his argument, and said: "These

are higher tactics than we should have been capable of." [See

CH`IEN HAN SHU, ch. 34, ff. 4, 5.] ]

59. For it is precisely when a force has fallen into harm's

way that is capable of striking a blow for victory.

[Danger has a bracing effect.]

60. Success in warfare is gained by carefully accommodating

ourselves to the enemy's purpose.

[Ts`ao Kung says: "Feign stupidity"--by an appearance of

yielding and falling in with the enemy's wishes. Chang Yu's note

makes the meaning clear: "If the enemy shows an inclination to

advance, lure him on to do so; if he is anxious to retreat, delay

on purpose that he may carry out his intention." The object is

to make him remiss and contemptuous before we deliver our

attack.]

61. By persistently hanging on the enemy's flank,

[I understand the first four words to mean "accompanying the

enemy in one direction." Ts`ao Kung says: "unite the soldiers

and make for the enemy." But such a violent displacement of

characters is quite indefensible.]

we shall succeed in the long run

[Literally, "after a thousand LI."]

in killing the commander-in-chief.

[Always a great point with the Chinese.]

62. This is called ability to accomplish a thing by sheer

cunning.

63. On the day that you take up your command, block the

frontier passes, destroy the official tallies,

[These were tablets of bamboo or wood, one half of which was

issued as a permit or passport by the official in charge of a

gate. Cf. the "border-warden" of LUN YU III. 24, who may have

had similar duties. When this half was returned to him, within a

fixed period, he was authorized to open the gate and let the

traveler through.]

and stop the passage of all emissaries.

[Either to or from the enemy's country.]

64. Be stern in the council-chamber,

[Show no weakness, and insist on your plans being ratified

by the sovereign.]

so that you may control the situation.

[Mei Yao-ch`en understands the whole sentence to mean: Take

the strictest precautions to ensure secrecy in your

deliberations.]

65. If the enemy leaves a door open, you must rush in.

66. Forestall your opponent by seizing what he holds dear,

[Cf. supra, ss. 18.]

and subtly contrive to time his arrival on the ground.

[Ch`en Hao`s explanation: "If I manage to seize a favorable

position, but the enemy does not appear on the scene, the

advantage thus obtained cannot be turned to any practical

account. He who intends therefore, to occupy a position of

importance to the enemy, must begin by making an artful

appointment, so to speak, with his antagonist, and cajole him

into going there as well." Mei Yao-ch`en explains that this

"artful appointment" is to be made through the medium of the

enemy's own spies, who will carry back just the amount of

information that we choose to give them. Then, having cunningly

disclosed our intentions, "we must manage, though starting after

the enemy, to arrive before him (VII. ss. 4). We must start

after him in order to ensure his marching thither; we must arrive

before him in order to capture the place without trouble. Taken

thus, the present passage lends some support to Mei Yao-ch`en's

interpretation of ss. 47.]

67. Walk in the path defined by rule,

[Chia Lin says: "Victory is the only thing that matters,

and this cannot be achieved by adhering to conventional canons."

It is unfortunate that this variant rests on very slight

authority, for the sense yielded is certainly much more

satisfactory. Napoleon, as we know, according to the veterans of

the old school whom he defeated, won his battles by violating

every accepted canon of warfare.]

and accommodate yourself to the enemy until you can fight a

decisive battle.

[Tu Mu says: "Conform to the enemy's tactics until a

favorable opportunity offers; then come forth and engage in a

battle that shall prove decisive."]

68. At first, then, exhibit the coyness of a maiden, until

the enemy gives you an opening; afterwards emulate the rapidity

of a running hare, and it will be too late for the enemy to

oppose you.

[As the hare is noted for its extreme timidity, the

comparison hardly appears felicitous. But of course Sun Tzu was

thinking only of its speed. The words have been taken to mean:

You must flee from the enemy as quickly as an escaping hare; but

this is rightly rejected by Tu Mu.]

[1] Giles' Biographical Dictionary, no. 399.

[2] "The Science of War," p. 333.

[3] "Stonewall Jackson," vol. I, p. 421.